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 The objective of this study is to examine the impact of environmental risk 
management (ERM) on the cost of debt. Prior research on this topic has been 
inconclusive. Under U.S. law, environmental damage caused by companies can result in 
very substantial cleanup costs and pollution fines, eventually leading to bankruptcy, 
impaired assets or reputation damage. It affects debtholders that have a contractual claim 
on the firm’s cash flows and assets. In some cases lenders can also be held directly 
responsible for environmental damage that happened at a borrower’s facility. The 
environmental risk management framework aims at controlling environmental risks by 
promoting waste reduction, “end-of-pipe” treatment of hazardous substances, continuous 
improvement and third-party auditing. This paper investigates whether debt investors 
consider environmental risk as a credit risk, and reward environmental risk management 
initiatives by lowering the cost of debt. I test this relation on a sample of S&P 500 firms 
from 2002 to 2007, using four different measures of environmental risk management and 
the initial bond yield spread as the cost of debt measure. The regression analysis shows 
that investors only reward efficient “end-of-pipe” treatment of hazardous substances with 
lower interest rates. It is consistent with the view that “end-of-pipe” treatment is a proxy 
for potential future environmental liabilities. Results have important implications for 
managers, as they know which part of the environmental risk management plan is 
scrutinized. Adding to previous papers, results confirm that the cost of capital is a key 
element in the relation between environmental and financial performance, along with 
resource efficiency. In particular, companies relying on debt financing may lower interest 
rates through environmental risk management, and then carry out more investments. 
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Over the past few years, worldwide concerns about global warming, climate 
change and future energy sources have led to a growing public awareness about the 
environment, especially since the Kyoto Protocol implementation date in 2005. 
Companies bear a substantial responsibility for pollution, energy consumption and 
environmental damage. Most of them have easily modified their communication towards 
customers and investors in order to highlight some environmentally friendly initiatives, 
but no real improvement towards a greener production can be massively carried out 
unless it is economically achievable or required by the regulator. And, as stated by Porter 
and Van Der Linde (1995), “the prevailing view is that there is an inherent and fixed 
trade-off: ecology versus the economy”. Therefore it is of strong interest to study the 
relation between environmental performance and financial performance. If a positive 
relation between ecology and competitiveness among companies can be found, it would 
send a clear message to managers, regulators and investors: firms would benefit from the 
implementation of greener processes, despite the capital expenditures incurred. In 
particular, Environmental Risk Management (ERM) is a key aspect of corporate 
environmental policy because it aims at dealing with environmental risks, which can result 
in corporate reputation damage, and material or financial losses. ERM can foster the 
implementation of more resource-efficient processes, but can also decrease the risk of 
financial losses due to pollution and compliance fines. As investors determine a firm’s 
cost of capital depending on the riskiness of its cash flows, they may reward the 
implementation of ERM with a lower cost of capital. A lower cost of capital would 
increase the profitability of the firm because projects would be financed by cheaper debt 
or equity capital. If a strong link between ERM and the cost of capital can be found, it will 
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confirm that environmental performance can impact financial performance, and help 
managers, regulators and investors to value green production.           
This work intends to study the impact of Environmental Risk Management in 
major U.S. manufacturing firms on their cost of public debt. It should clarify the view that 
corporate debt market investors have on environmental risks, and the measurable impact 
of this view on outstanding debt.  
Many papers have studied the empirical relation between environmental 
performance and financial performance. When positive correlation was found, most of 
scholars have suggested that resource efficiency brought by environmental concerns was 
the source of this positive correlation. More recently, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) 
proposed another approach of this relation. According to them, a proper management of 
environmental risks would lower the cost of capital and then help achieve a higher 
financial performance. Yet, Sharfman and Fernando fail to conclude that higher level of 
ERM leads to a lower cost of debt, and they call for future research. In this paper, I 
propose to solve this issue and add evidence to the relation between environmental risks 
and the cost of capital. 
The link between ERM and the cost of debt is of strong interest for companies, as 
they have heavily relied on debt to finance their projects since 2002. Debt accounted for 
about 30% of all sources of funds in 2005 for U.S. companies (Brealey, 2006), whereas net 
equity issues were negative in the same year. Because of this dependence, companies are 
interested in reducing their cost of debt. This link is also considered by investors, willing 
to seek “green alpha”: it is the influence of environmental factors on profitability and 
financial performance. “Green alpha” could be the source of arbitrage opportunities if 
some information, such as the efficiency of ERM frameworks implemented by 
companies, was not fully captured by traditional Wall Street analytics but had a real impact 
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on debt covenants. Investors have progressively developed an interest for environmental 
considerations. According to a 2007 report from the Social Investment Forum (Social 
Investment Forum, 2007), around 11% of assets under professional management in the 
U.S. are now involved in Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), which includes 
environmental criteria. More important, SRI assets grew more than 4.2 times during the 
1995-2007 period, whereas the broader universe of U.S. assets under professional 
management increased less than 3.7 times. Investors are also increasingly aware of 
environmental contingencies and related capital expenditures through SEC filings (such as 
10-K annual reports of 10-Q quarterly reports), as required by regulation S-K (Lawyer 
Links, 2002).  
Using a different approach of the environmental performance measurement, cost 
of debt measurement, a more focused panel and larger time span than Sharfman and 
Fernando, I find that debt investors do consider environmental risks when buying public 
debt securities, but that they only look at some aspects of the environmental risk 
management framework. More specifically, they look at “end-of-pipe” treatment and the 
release of hazardous waste but not at third-party auditing or toxic waste generation. Those 
results add to the literature on empirical links between environmental and financial 
performance, but also help support the alternative to a resource efficiency theoretical 
framework. It brings evidence that public debt investors take environmental factors into 
account, and reward greener manufacturing companies by demanding a lower interest rate 
on debt issues. This study also contributes to the research on cost of debt determinants. 
In the next section, I review the existing literature on environmental and financial 
performance, as well as on ERM and the cost of capital. In a third section, I develop the 
two hypotheses that should be tested empirically, and the rationale for choosing them. 
The first hypothesis is based on the study of indirect environmental risks and agency 
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problems. The second hypothesis is based on the study of direct environmental risks. In 
section 4, I present the research design that I propose to use. I first detail the panels used 
as well as the testing period. Then I build the main measures to be studied: the cost of 
debt measure and the ERM measure. I finally introduce the statistical model chosen to 
test the hypotheses, and the remaining control variables. The main results of the two 
statistical regressions are reported and interpreted in section 5. Section 6 discusses the 
implications of those results for companies, investors and credit rating agencies, and 
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2 Literature review 
 
This chapter intends to give an overview of the writings that preceded this work 
on the fields of environmental performance, cost of capital and environmental risk 
management.  
 
2.1 Previous research on corporate environmental performance 
Scholars’ interest in the link between corporate environmental standards and 
business matters arose in the seventies, along with the creation of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). In one of the first papers on the topic, Spicer (1978, p108-109) 
found that “for a sample drawn from the pulp and paper industry, companies with better 
pollution-control records tend to have higher profitability, larger size, lower total risk, 
lower systematic risk and higher price/earnings ratios than companies with poorer 
pollution-control records”. At that time, Spicer presented his work as relevant to the 
social performance field. That is because corporate environmental performance, along 
with social and governance issues, has long been omitted in investment and management 
theory, even if it could have a meaningful impact on corporate performance. As a result, 
scholars have first considered those several non-traditional fields altogether. Those fields 
mainly represent social, environmental and governance issues, and have been referred to 
as CSP (Corporate Social Performance), CSR (Corporate Social responsibility), ESG 
(Environmental Social and Governance) or SRI (Socially Responsible Investing). The 
numerous names have added confusion on the topic, given that they already refer to 
multidimensional constructs: Hull and Rothenberg (2008, p781) state that “there has been 
difficulty identifying an objective, generally available measure of CSP, which has 
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contributed to disparity and irreproducibility in earlier results”. In order to avoid such 
confusion scholars have also developed research on the “environmental field” alone, that 
is to say pollution and risk measurement. This paper will use this approach. 
Over time, many scholars have studied the empirical relation between 
environmental and financial performance. A recent study (Murphy, 2002) summarized 
twenty recent papers on this topic. Many correlations have been drawn between 
environmental performance and stock market reactions. Every release of a new 
environmental performance indicator has called for an appropriate study, such as the 
recent Eco-Efficiency coefficient (Derwall et al., 2005). Among the studies that used stock 
returns as the financial performance measure, it is possible to identify portfolio studies 
(White, 1996; Cohen et al., 1997), event studies (Hamilton, 1995) and finally time-series 
studies (Konar and Cohen, 2001). Portfolio studies usually try to compare several 
mutually exclusive set of companies based on environmental indicators, and analyze stock 
return differences between those portfolios. White (1996) builds “green”, “oatmeal” and 
“brown” equity portfolios depending on CEP (Council on Economic Priorities) 
environmental ratings and finds that the “green” portfolio offers significant higher 
investment returns over the 1989-1992 period. Hamilton (1995) found that publicly 
traded firms that reported emission of toxic material in the 1989 Toxic Release Inventory 
(TRI) experienced “negative, statistically significant abnormal returns upon the first 
release of the information”. Konar and Cohen (2001) build a regression to analyze 
environmental and financial performance for manufacturing firms composing the S&P 
500 index. They also use the TRI, as well as the number of environmental lawsuits 
pending against firms as a proxy for environmental liabilities. They establish that 
“environmental performance affects firm market valuation” because the firm’s Tobin Q is 
negatively related to the two environmental variables mentioned above.  
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By contrast Mahapatra (1984), using a similar method, concludes that equity 
investors do not reward companies for significant environmental capital expenditures and 
a more responsible behavior. Mahapatra also concludes that “the investors view pollution 
control expenditures, legally or voluntary, as a drain on resources which could have been 
invested profitably” (p37). He advocates that companies willing to adhere to better 
environmental standard are likely to face capital expenditures required to adapt 
manufacturing processes. Other scholars disagree and argue that despite the costs 
incurred, companies may benefit from greener processes that would consume fewer 
resources for the same output, attract new customers with a better reputation or avoid 
costly environmental accidents and compliance fines. This led to the debate of whether it 
“pays to be green” or not. Adding to this debate, the studies of stock market reactions 
detailed previously tend to prove that improving environmental performance is eventually 
rewarding. The review of the research detailed by Murphy (2002, p1) tends to show an 
increasing impact of environmental performance on corporate profitability and stock 
market reaction: “Financial accounting measures, such as return on equity (ROE) and 
return on assets (ROA), have been shown to increase with improved environmental 
performance” and “empirical studies have found that companies that score well according 
to objective environmental criteria realize stronger financial returns than the overall 
market”. 
Along with empirical studies, scholars have tried to build an underlying theoretical 
framework that would explain the results found on corporate samples. The main 
argument for a positive impact of environmental performance on corporate financial 
results lies in resource efficiency (Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Bansal and Roth, 
2000). It states that reducing environmental footprint would push for manufacturing 
process improvement, and this improvement in efficiency would lead to a better use of 
resource. To put it simple, producing less waste would be done by consuming fewer raw 
CORPORATE ERM AND                              FLORENT ROSTAING                                               2009                       c 




materials for the same output, and it would reduce the use of costly raw materials and 
chemicals. Other theoretical models have been developed. Arora and Gangopadhyay 
(1995) build a mathematical model to analyze the environmental behavior of firms when 
customers value environmental quality, even though they cannot always afford the 
“green” products. They find that public image of a company is a key variable, and when 
customers have actually developed an environmental awareness firms will voluntarily 
choose to overcomply with environmental standards. In doing so, they will be able to 
develop products that support the image of firms being environmentally conscious and 
gain market shares. As a result, corporate environmental performance would foster 
corporate growth. Alternatively, Salop and Scheffman (1987) consider a mathematical 
model where some companies play a “nonprice predatory conduct” and try to raise rival’s 
costs instead of lower rival’s revenue as the predatory pricing doctrine recommends. In 
other words, companies that have chosen to massively invest in greener processes and 
that finally overcomply with current regulation might convince regulators that, based on 
their own experience, more stringent environmental standards are economically 
achievable. Thus they would push for tougher rules and eventually raise rivals’ costs.  
 
2.2 Environmental performance and financial returns  
In past literature, the theoretical underpinnings of the correlation between 
environmental and financial performance mainly relies on the resource efficiency view. It 
is the idea that greener manufacturing, greener processes will translate into a reduction of 
resources to be managed by the company, and eventually will help improving financial 
performance. In 1995, Porter and Van Der Linde (1995) have been among the first to 
theorize about competitiveness and efficiency arising from environmental improvement. 
They observe that pollution is somewhat a form of economic waste, a sign that resources 
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are used incompletely or inefficiently, and also that managers see pollution reduction as a 
financial burden for the firm because it would mean investing in costly end-of-pipe 
pollution treatment. Instead, Porter and Van Der Linde argue that firms should use 
process innovation to solve the problem of high pollution and in this case “innovation 
offsets will be common because reducing pollution is often coincident with improving the 
productivity with which resources are used” (p98). They cite many industrial examples 
where pollution reduction efforts using innovation and a broad approach of 
manufacturing process have finally led to greener processes. Those greener processes are 
more efficient, require less input resources and produce less waste to be treated by the 
company and the customers. As a result, the net cost of environmental performance has 
turned into a net benefit, supporting the idea that environmental performance is linked to 
financial performance through resource efficiency. Clarkson et al. (2004, p333) best 
summarize the idea of Porter and Van Der Linde: “environmental regulations can trigger 
innovations that will improve corporate operational efficiency by the substitution of less 
costly materials, by better utilization of materials in the process, or by converting waste 
into more valuable forms. In addition, best environmental performers enjoy early-mover 
advantages by tapping into the international market that is moving rapidly toward valuing 
low-pollution and energy-efficient products”. It can be noticed that Porter and Van Der 
Linde apply here the “resource-based view of the firm”, a broader framework of the 
management theory (Hart, 1995; Sirmon et al., 2007), to raw materials and waste. 
According to this framework, resource management is a key factor that ultimately leads to 
competitive advantage and higher profitability.  
Following the reasoning of Porter and Van Der Linde, it is acknowledged that 
“end-of-pipe” pollution treatment adds costs, whereas in general a complete review of the 
manufacturing process leads to resource optimization and an increase in profitability. An 
empirical analysis conducted by King and Lenox (2002, p289) is consistent with this view: 
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based on a study of 614 firms during the 1991-1996 period, they find “strong evidence 
that waste prevention leads to financial gain but […] no evidence that firms profit from 
reducing pollution by other means”. Also consistent with the resource efficiency view, 
Hart and Ahuja (1996) document that S&P 500 firms which engage in emission reduction 
enjoy enhanced operating performance one or two years later. 
In response to an early work of Porter (1991), however, Walley and Whitehead 
(1994) argue that win-win situations such as those depicted previously may have been 
created by a long period of environmental inaction. When environmental regulation 
appeared, companies had got the time to prepare more efficient processes. According to 
Walley and Whitehead, opportunity of process improvement and its link to resource 
efficiency and financial performance may not last. They also argue that managers will lack 
a solid framework to help them allocating funds properly between green projects and 
other strategic investments in the future. 
 
2.3 Environmental risks, cost of capital and financial returns 
More recently, several scholars have argued that the link between environmental 
and financial performance could be driven not only by resource efficiency, but also by a 
proper management of environmental risks. Environmental risks may directly harm 
financial returns on the short term, but more importantly it appears that they could 
indirectly lead to financial gains on the long term if they are properly handled. The main 
idea is that environmental risks are part of corporate risks, so they can influence the cost 
of capital. Given that companies rely on the cost of capital to make investment decisions, 
companies with lower environmental risks and a lower cost of capital would be able to 
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carry out more investments and would have higher financial results. Yet the correlation 
between environmental risks and the cost of capital has to be confirmed empirically. 
Early papers have studied the link between environmental risks, or environmental 
liabilities, and the cost of capital. Those articles include Feldman et al. (1998), Garber and 
Hammitt (1998) and Graham et al. (2001). But none of them did focus on potential gains 
from the reduction of environmental risks, and they did not pay attention to debt 
financing even though it is a major financing source for large companies. Feldman et al. 
(1998) find a positive effect of environmental performance on firm’s β, which is used to 
compute the cost of equity capital. Due to the proprietary nature of their model, as they 
promote the ICF Kaiser environmental coefficients, they do not disclose sufficient details 
to fully understand their measures and results beyond what they assert. Garber and 
Hammitt (1998) study the impact of environmental liabilities on the cost of capital for 73 
chemical companies from 1988 to 1992. They use six alternative measures of liability 
exposure under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), ranging from the number of sites on the National Priority List 
(NPL) to the number of sites proposed to be on the list. They conclude that 
environmental liabilities are positively correlated to the cost of capital for larger firms, but 
they find no relation for small firms. Even though they talk about the cost of capital, they 
want their study to focus solely on the cost of equity, so they make the assumption that 
firm’s cost of debt is fixed. Finally, Graham et al. (2001) examine whether credit ratings of 
new bond issues reflect firm’s environmental liabilities, using a sample of new bond issues 
rated by Moody’s from 1990 to 1992 and a logistic regression model. Liabilities are again 
estimated using exposure to CERCLA, with similarities to Garber and Hammitt. Their 
findings suggest that credit rating analysts take environmental liabilities into account. In 
particular, the number of sites on the NPL and their estimated cost for the company have 
a strong influence on ratings and are associated with a possible deterioration of a firm’s 
CORPORATE ERM AND                              FLORENT ROSTAING                                               2009                       c 




credit rating (which usually lead to a higher cost of debt). It is consistent with publicly 
disclosed criteria from rating agencies, stating that they take environmental liabilities into 
account (Standard & Poor’s, 2008, pp 28, 56, 93). 
 In early 2008, Sharfman and Fernando published an article studying the relation 
between firm’s level of Environmental Risk Management (ERM) and the resulting cost of 
capital, which can be debt or equity capital. They are the first to theorize about potential 
financial gains from a better management of environmental risks. They argue that ERM 
will reduce the expected costs of financial distress and the probability of events that 
would reduce firm’s profitability or impair its reputation. As a result, a higher level of 
ERM should be associated with a lower corporate risk and a lower cost of equity and 
debt. In return a lower cost of capital would increase the profitability of the firm because 
current activities and future projects would be financed by cheaper capital, and the 
discounting rate for firm’s cash flows would be lowered. It is a new approach that does 
not intend to counter the popular view of resource efficiency. It is rather a parallel 
mechanism that would grant a more active role to investors in pushing for greener 
manufacturing. The framework would be distinctive from the resource view because “the 
lowering in the firm’s cost of capital due to a reduction in the perceived riskiness of its 
cash flows (from environmental risk management) can be differentiated both conceptually 
and empirically from an increase in its cash flows from greater revenues and/or lowered 
costs due to improved resource efficiency through better environmental performance” 
(Sharfman and Fernando,  2008, p 570). Conducting the analysis, they prove that a higher 
level of ERM is associated with a lower cost of equity and a lower Weighted Average Cost 
of Capital (WACC) but they fail to validate their hypothesis on the cost of debt: results 
indicate that the higher the level of ERM in a firm, the higher the cost of debt. Because 
their hypothesis about the cost of debt is unsupported, they call for further research on 
CORPORATE ERM AND                              FLORENT ROSTAING                                               2009                       c 




the topic. I intend to clarify this relation. To begin, it is interesting to analyze the model of 
Sharfman and Fernando and the potential flaws in it.  
I now focus on the treatment that Sharfman and Fernando use to test the specific 
correlation between ERM and the cost of debt. They start their analysis with the 
construction of an environmental risk management measure. They intend to rely upon 
several indicators, quantitative and qualitative, and to combine them into one single 
indicator that would demonstrate convergent validity in the measure. They choose the 
following Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) measures as quantitative measures: total TRI 
emissions, total TRI emissions treated onsite for toxicity reduction and total TRI 
emissions re-used or recycled to create energy onsite. Those three measures are then 
scaled by firm’s total waste generation (including TRI emissions), in order to obtain 
percentage of waste. For a qualitative measure, they select a measure of “environmental 
strengths” and a measure of “environmental weaknesses” provided by the social 
investment screening firm Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co. (KLD). Then they try to 
combine those final five measures (three TRI ratios and two KLD scores) into one single 
indicator of ERM, using an exploratory factor analysis. Based on Kaiser’s rule, they 
extract one factor, the only one to have an eigenvalue over 1. This factor accounts for 
43% of the variance in their data. Then, Sharfman and Fernando collect firm’s cost of 
debt: they use the firm’s marginal cost of borrowing provided by Bloomberg. They 
obtained meaningful results only with a one year lag between ERM measures and WACC 
measure so they assume a one year lag for the rest of the study. As for the question of 
control variables, they empirically study industry differences. They conduct an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) followed by a Dunnett’s T3 test using their WACC measure as the 
dependent variable, and two-digit industry SIC codes as the independent variable. They 
find a group of six SIC codes that are heterogeneous with the others so they create a 
single dummy variable to account for differences between those two groups. As for the 
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other control variables, they use financial leverage and the logarithm of market 
capitalization to account for firm size. The sample chosen is based on firms from the S&P 
500 index. Missing data reduced the sample to 267 firm-year observations. Finally, 
Sharfman and Fernando use hierarchical regression analysis, also known as sequential 
regression. In this type of analysis independent variables are added one by one into the 
regression and their marginal contribution to the model is then assessed. The results, as 
explained before, are inconclusive. But several steps of the analysis are debatable and 
deserve further studies: 
o KLD ratings are computed using a non-disclosed scale. They take an 
important number of criteria into account but some criteria are irrelevant to 
the study of ERM (use of alternative fuel, contribution to climate change). 
Such ratings do not usually take into account the specificity of firm’s industry. 
o In exploratory factor analysis, a usual criterion is to look at the variance 
explained by factors, and to retain factors that can explain at least 70% of it 
(Stevens, 1992). Here Sharfman and Fernando use a factor that accounts for 
43% of the variance in their data. They do not give any details on the marginal 
increase in variance explained if two factors are selected instead of one. 
Furthermore, they do not specify the factor loadings on original measures, and 
especially their signs, which seem to indicate that the measures selected are 
positively correlated to the ERM factor. Lack of information does not allow 
the reader to fully understand how the ERM measure is built. 
o The choice of Bloomberg estimates as the cost of debt measure is debatable. 
Sharfman and Fernando do not indicate how Bloomberg calculates this cost 
and at which time of the year. It is likely that this cost includes the weighted 
short-term cost of debt based on commercial paper issue, for which investors 
may not focus on long-term issues such as environmental risk management. 
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Research studies using cost of debt measures usually take bond yield spread, 
credit ratings or ratios of interest expenses as the best proxies for a firm’s cost 
of debt. 
o As for the control of industry effect, Sharfman and Fernando use a single 
dummy variable to account for industry differences among thirty-nine 
different SIC codes, which may not be completely adequate and may prevent a 
generalization of the results to a different panel. One can notice that this 
dummy is built by analyzing differences of weighted average cost of capital, 
which is the focus of their study. It may not be appropriate for the cost of 
debt measure. 
o The choice of a one-year lag between the measurement of ERM and the cost 
of debt, based on meaningful results with the WACC, seem to be inconsistent 
with the real sequence of events. When Sharfman and Fernando conducted 
their analysis in 2006 using TRI figures from 2001 and cost of capital figures 
from 2002, all data were indeed available. But back in 2002, the 2001 TRI data 
were not received by U.S. EPA before June 2002, and they were released to 
investors in a preliminary form around March 2003. So it is unlikely that 
investors knew the proper figures, the one used in the analysis to compute the 
level of ERM, when they priced the firm’s cost of debt in 2002. 
All in all, managers, investors and regulators are left with little tangible information on 
ERM and its impact on the cost of debt. Theoretical frameworks primarily indicate a 
positive relation between the two variables, but empirical evidence is missing. In the 
following chapters, I propose to clarify the relation between ERM and the cost of debt.
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3 Hypothesis development 
 
 
Following the cost of capital approach developed by Sharfman and Fernando, I 
intend to clarify the relation between the level of Environmental Risk Management 
(ERM) and the cost of debt, which results from the view that investors have on ERM 
efficiency. Before testing empirical relations, it is fundamental to explore theoretical 
underpinnings.  
The view expressed by Sharfman and Fernando is that the level of ERM should 
be negatively correlated with the cost of debt capital, that is to say a better level of ERM 
that potentially lowers environmental risks should be rewarded with lower interest payable 
on outstanding debt. Adding to this approach, I find several theoretical reasons 
supporting this view. Based on existing literature and current regulation, I find that 
indirect environmental risks, agency problems and direct environmental risks theoretically 
support the negative impact of ERM on the cost of debt. 
 
3.1 Debt and indirect environmental risk 
The first argument supporting this correlation is that ERM prevents borrower’s 
environmental liabilities from impairing debtholder’s wealth (principal or interest 
payment). For instance, impairment arises when environmental damage at the borrower’s 
facility indirectly affects the loan: the credit quality of the borrower deteriorates markedly 
because he is required to conduct costly cleanup operations, or the contaminated real 
property held as collateral has to be abandoned because cleanup costs exceed the 
borrower’s balance.  
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As stated in corporate finance theory, the cost of debt mainly depends on the risk 
associated with debt, that is to say the probability that the borrower will default 
(Vernimmen, 2005). As a result the cost of debt is measured by the spread, i.e. the 
difference between the interest rate granted for the loan and the risk-free rate of treasury 
bonds. That is because lenders do not share the upside gains realized by a business, so 
their primary interest is in the downside: the risk of default (Darabaris, 2008). And as 
firm’s risk is a function of the uncertainty inherent in its future activities (Orlitzky and 
Benjamin, 2001), they are concerned about any future exposure to litigation, liabilities or 
capital expenditures. Due to ever more stringent environmental regulation in the US, and 
especially under CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act) in place since the eighties, environmental costs weakening a borrower's 
ability to repay a bank have increased the number of loan defaults (Case, 1999). Those 
environmental costs, such as toxic tort liability, fines for violations of environmental laws 
and regulations, cleanup costs, capital expenditures imposed by Court for environmental 
compliance and risk prevention following pollution (Zuber and Berry, 1992) affect the 
lender indirectly. For the borrower, indirect environmental risks translate into financial 
risks through (Darabaris, 2008 and Norton et al, 1995): 
o Balance sheet risk (historic liabilities, impaired assets such as real property 
values, underwriting losses) 
o Operating risk (emissions and discharge risk, product liability risk, required 
process changes) 
o Capital cost risk (pollution control expenditures, product redesign costs) 
o Transaction risk (potential cost of time, money, and delayed or cancelled 
acquisitions or divestitures) 
o Market risk (corporate reputation and image, reduced customer acceptance) 
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To a lesser extent, poor environmental management will also increase the “business 
sustainability risk”. It is caused by a lack of efficiency in the use of energy, materials, and 
resources, and it affects the long term prospects of the firm (Darabaris, 2008). Practically, 
it may translate into worse financial performance and then worse credit grading.  
 Indirect environmental risk may also affect secured lenders more deeply. Secured 
lenders may, in case of bankruptcy, have to foreclose on the assets held as collateral for 
the loan, in order to protect a security interest (i.e. recover the principal). But pollution 
can be then found to affect the asset. Even if the lender is not liable for cleanup costs 
(which is considered a direct environmental risk) at this point, he will likely incur losses 
through impairment of both the value and saleability of the property (land, building, and 
equipment) held as loan collateral. Because cleanup costs are capitalized into property 
value, there is a serious risk that market value will decrease (Richards, 1997; Case, 1999). It 
means that a lender may be forced to pay part of cleanup costs through a loss in security 
value, even if he is not supposed to directly pay for them. And despite a fully completed 
cleanup, it is likely that potential buyers will avoid taking extra risks, and will not take over 
an environmentally sensitive asset. This may finally affect asset liquidity, as property 
transactions may be prohibited before cleanup. It is all the more a dangerous risk for 
secured lenders as land and buildings have always been considered "sound" investments 
(Thompson, 1992), and as secured lenders basically hold a collateral to decrease loan risk. 
Eventually, it is worth mentioning that if indirect environmental risk alone may not have 
the magnitude to bankrupt a company, it will more likely appear in times of financial 
trouble, amplify any problem and lead to bankruptcy. That is because in a company in 
financial difficulty, managers will likely put environmental matters aside (for example 
waste will be left on site to save money, potentially causing contamination) (Case, 1999).  
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It appears that in the case of indirect environmental risks, ERM is well designed to 
mitigate the effects of environmental damage on loan repayment. Proper risk control and 
risk financing through insurance will prevent environmental damage and environmental 
costs that could lead to bankruptcy or impaired collateral value. A well implemented ERM 
might lead to lower premiums payable on insurance policies (Voorhees and Woellner, 
1998) but also to a higher quality of environmental disclosure. Literature shows that firms 
with higher disclosure quality have a lower cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998; Mazumdar and 
Sengupta, 2005).  Moreover, insurance contracts as well as investments to improve 
resource efficiency are long term in nature, so ERM is likely to be still effective even when 
a company faces financial troubles and takes higher environmental risks on the short 
term. 
All in all, environmental risk is a credit risk that will potentially affect all kind of 
lenders, because it has a negative impact on the borrower's creditworthiness and ability to 
repay the loan (Ezovski, 2008). As a result, ERM should be recognized by investors and 
should be rewarded by a lower cost of debt, as it lowers the default risk arising from 
indirect environmental risk. It may translate into a better credit rating, as some rating 
agencies include environmental factors in their criteria and as financial institutions build 
credit rating systems that take the environmental profile into account (Case, 1999). 
Although indirect environmental risks are still not a major concern in the credit rating 
process, one should keep in mind that ratings are discrete. Two loans or bonds having the 
same rating may still carry a different level of risk. As a result, ERM may well be a 
discriminatory factor hiding a potential upward value (or downward risk) that can be 
captured by debtholders. It means that there could be an arbitrage opportunity for debt 
investors, based on environmental criteria (Darabaris, 2008). 
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3.2 Agency problems 
Agency problems refer to potential conflicts between creditors, shareholders and 
the management because of differing goals. Risk management is one of those. According 
to the widely known and used theory of Modigliani-Miller, combined with the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), investors in equity do not accept to pay for what they can 
themselves do at no cost (Vernimmen, 2005). So capital investors do not reward risk 
management practices because they can freely diversify their portfolio, which is a 
powerful tool of risk management. That is why the widely used CAPM valuation model 
only takes into account the systematic risk (or market risk) of the securities, but not the 
firm-specific (or idiosyncratic) risk. By contrast, debtholders take firm-specific risk into 
account in their models of default risk, and price it. That is because debt securities have a 
limited upside potential but a much greater downside potential: the best case scenario for 
a lender is to get the promised cash flows; any other scenario impacts wealth (Damodaran, 
2001). So debtholders price risk management practices as part of a decrease in firm-
specific risk, unlike shareholders. Indeed modern practices in structured finance mitigate 
the impact of default for debt investors, but they cannot prevent losses due to the fact 
that debt investors still rely on promised cash-flow and not expected cash-flows.  
Moreover, according to Smith and Stulz (1985, p398) the hedging practice of risk 
management “redistributes wealth from shareholders to bondholders in a way that makes 
shareholders worse off”. They argue that shareholders will be tempted to ignore their own 
promise to hedge after raising debt, and to reverse risk management activities, leading to 
agency problems. That is because risk management practices generally increase fixed costs 
for companies, leading to a decrease in profit and dividend payout for shareholders. On 
the other hand, the price of debt securities will be lowered to reflect a higher risk if risk 
management activities are reversed. Shareholder’s gain is the bondholder’s loss. As a result 
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ERM should be rewarded by debtholders, who acquire a protection against a decrease in 
the value of debt securities. Even if the underlying Modigliani-Miller theory is perfectible, 
it casts light on the fact that debtholders should benefit from ERM or any risk 
management framework prior to shareholders. Because past studies show an 
unquestionable shareholder’s interest in ERM and environmental performance, along with 
a lower cost of equity capital (Sharfman and Fernando 2008, Murphy 2002), ERM is also 
expected to influence more risk-adverse debtholders in the same way. 
 
According to the two theoretical arguments detailed previously, the cost of debt is 
expected to take the implementation of an effective environmental risk management into 
account. It is a matter of good business sense that lenders' practices should include 
environmental risk considerations and that the pricing structures should be amended to 
reflect the true risk being carried in their books (Thompson, 1992). As stated by Ira 
Feldman, a former EPA director: "Lenders and insurers are going to understand how to 
use the existence of an Environmental Management System along with performance 
indicators in their determination of who gets access to capital and preferred rates”. 
Following Sharfman and Fernando (2008) I test empirically the following hypothesis: 
H1: The level of Environmental Risk Management should be negatively correlated with the cost 
of debt, for a given level of debt. 
 
3.3 Debt and direct environmental risk 
Under current U.S. law, lenders may also be held directly responsible for 
environmental damage. Unlike indirect risk, direct environmental risk is less likely to 
CORPORATE ERM AND                              FLORENT ROSTAING                                               2009                       c 




occur but more damaging for the lender. Moreover, direct risk usually comes along with 
indirect risk. It only concerns secured and unsecured bank lenders, not public debtholders 
or lease agents (McGraw and Roberts, 2001). 
Direct environmental risk in the US arises from the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, also called 
Superfund) which gave EPA broad authority to conduct hazardous site cleanup. Because 
hazardous waste sites usually create very substantial environmental damage, cleanup 
efforts often require capital expenditures of several millions of dollars, and take decades 
of operations and monitoring. In order to fully support those efforts, “CERCLA imposes 
liability on a broad group of Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) that includes the site's 
current owner, and anyone who owned or operated the facility when hazardous 
substances were disposed, generated hazardous substances disposed of at the facility, 
transported hazardous substances to a disposal facility they selected, and/or arranged for 
such transportation” (Barth and McNichols, 1994, p181). In the nineties, estimated 
cleanup costs payable by PRPs under CERCLA would range from $500 billion to $750 
billion (Lavelle, 1992; Russell et al., 1992). What is certain is that cleanup costs of several 
million dollars per hazardous site have and had the potential to bankrupt a substantial 
number of companies, operators or owners designated as PRPs under CERCLA. When 
polluting firms have low asset value compared to cleanup costs for pollution they could 
cause, insolvency makes such firms “judgment proof” and they have too little incentive to 
prevent such accidents (Shavell 1986, Summers 1983, Heyes 1996). Theoretical models 
supported by scholars have shown that in this case, increasing the liability of the creditor, 
which has “deep pockets” (meaning it will not be bankrupt easily), will force him to 
monitor loans and influence borrowers on environmental compliance. This should lead to 
a decline in the number of accident (Picthford 1995, Ulph and Valentini 2004). 
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As such, the tendency in the nineties has been to target “deep-pocket” PRPs that 
could pay for cleanup costs without going bankrupt (Slaney, 1996), but also bigger firms: 
“investors may expect larger firms to bear a disproportionate share of Superfund 
(CERCLA) costs because they have deeper pockets or because smaller firms may more 
readily escape government attention and suits for contribution by other PRPs” (Garber 
and Hammitt, 1998, p276). There are basically two defenses for lenders and debtholders 
under CERCLA, discussed in Norton et al. (1995): 
o  The definition of “owner or operator” excludes “a person, who, without 
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of 
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility” 
(USC §9601). 
o “Innocent landowners” who acquire title but do not know or have reason to 
know the existence of the hazardous substances and who have undertaken 
“appropriate inquiry” into the previous ownership “consistent with good 
commercial or customary practice” may be free from liability (USC §9601). 
Still, debtholders have been the target of CERCLA liability over the past. In the early 
nineties, a report from the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System observes 
that court actions have resulted in some banking organizations being held liable for the 
cleanup of hazardous substance contamination. Those banking organizations may have 
encountered losses from direct liability under CERCLA because they were identified as 
being owner or operators of the facility where environmental damage occurred. This led 
to the famous case of “Fleet Factors” 1 (Norton et al., 1995; Goldfarb and Weintraub, 
                                                 
1 In 1976, the banking organization Fleet Factors (“Fleet”) had agreed to advance funds to a cloth-printing 
facility, SPW. As collateral, SPW granted Fleet a security interest in its textile facility, equipment, inventory 
and fixtures. SPW subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and later Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
As a result, Fleet decided to foreclose on its security interest in 1982 and hired one contractor to auction the 
personal property and another contractor to remove the unsold equipment and leave the premises clean. 
Two years later, the EPA inspected the SPW facility and found ground pollution, toxic chemicals and 
asbestos, so it sued SPW's two principal stockholders and Fleet to pay for cleanup costs. The district court 
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1993; Slaney, 1996; Smith, 1991). Other cases included the Mirabile case (1981) and 
Bergsoe Metal (1990). The fact that the judicial interpretation of CERCLA became 
inconsistent with its judicial implementation (Kobayashi, 2005) led to a paradoxical 
situation where lenders were asked to monitor, control and advise borrowers, but could 
be held directly liable for environmental costs because of their influence on the firm’s 
management. Since then, the Fleet Factors case and the following legal developments2 
have created a “chill factor”: banks have become reluctant to lend to some sectors with 
potential environmental risks (Case, 1999).  
Moreover, lender’s insurance covering environmental cleanup costs, such as General 
Liability Policies and Environmental Impairment Liability, were withdrawn in that time, 
following huge losses that arose with legal change (Case, 1999). The market progressively 
returned to normal after 2000 and now offers comprehensive coverage (Bressler and 
Peltz, 2002). Finally, it is only recently that the EPA clarified the actions a lender could 
undertake to avoid CERCLA liability if he finances the purchase of a contaminated 
property that needs to be cleaned3. The EPA also explained that lenders would be 
exposed to direct environmental risk if  
o They exercise decision-making control over the environmental compliance of 
insolvent companies. 
                                                                                                                                             
found Fleet directly liable for response costs under CERCLA, because when pollution occurred Fleet was 
somehow participating in the facility management.  
The court explained that a secured creditor may be liable without being an operator if it participated in the 
management of a facility “to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation’s treatment of 
hazardous waste”. Fleet Factors was finally forced to pay for environmental cleanup it had been held liable 
for.  
2 In response to high concerns among the lending community after the Fleet Factors case, the EPA issued a 
lender liability rule in 1992 which helped define the scope of lenders’ permissible activities, for which they 
would not be held directly liable. Two years later, the rule was voided because the court determined it 
exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority, in the case “Kelly vs EPA” (Darabaris, 2008). EPA’s lender-liability 
rule was reintroduced by law in 1996 (“Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance 
Protection Act of 1996”). 
3 EPA’s All Appropriate Inquiries (AAI) in November 2005 states that lenders should have a qualified 
environmental professional conduct an environmental site assessment (AAI- or E 1527-05-compliant Phase 
I) prior to purchase, to establish a defense under CERCLA and gain federal cleanup liability protection 
(Pollard and Haberlen, 2008). One can notice that the assessment should be paid by the lender. 
CORPORATE ERM AND                              FLORENT ROSTAING                                               2009                       c 




o They themselves cause pollution on the site after foreclosure, when they hold 
the owner status. 
o They further consider the foreclosed collateral as an investment, and do not 
dispose of the asset within 6 months by accepting fair offers (Goldfarb and 
Weintraub, 1993). 
 
The potential cost of direct environmental liability for lenders under CERCLA 
cannot be disregarded. A lender could lose more money than he initially invested, because 
cleanup costs charged to a convicted lender bear no relation with the initial amount of the 
loan (Case, 1999). On top of that, a lender foreclosing on a contaminated property will 
face indirect environmental costs but will also be forced to urgently dispose of the asset 
by accepting any “fair” offer (which may include a discount for hidden risks or cleanup 
costs), for fear of being held directly liable under CERCLA. 
 There is evidence on literature that banks take direct liability into account. Firms 
facing environmental risk must go through stringent lender monitoring before being 
approved, and banks have developed a comparative advantage over other market 
participants in screening and monitoring corporate clients (Thompson and Cowton 2004, 
Aintablian et al 2007). Most commercial lending institutions have created full ERM 
departments with several senior risk managers to monitor environmental risks on lending 
operations (Delamaide, 2008), as part of the normal credit appraisal process. A recent 
survey (Ezovski, 2008) of U.S. financial institutions shows that 94 percent of banks have a 
formal environmental policy in place, which can be used for environmental due diligence 
in the commercial underwriting process. It means that banks are aware of environmental 
risks they bear on loans, and as environmental risk is a risk among others, it should be 
taken into account in the loan pricing structure. There is also evidence that CERCLA has 
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caused a “chill factor”, with banks restricting credit access to environmentally sensitive 
companies (Greenberg and Shaw 1992, Schmidheiny and Zorraquin 1996). Theoretical 
models by McGraw and Roberts (2001) and Ulph and Valentini (2004) show that direct 
lender liability should lead to credit rationing and/or a higher cost of bank debt. That is 
why I propose to test the following hypothesis: 
H2: The correlation between ERM and the cost of debt should be negative and more significant 
for commercial debt issued by banks than for public debt, ceteris paribus. In particular, secured 
commercial debt should be more affected by environmental risks. 
In order to compare the significance level between panels of public debt and commercial 
debt, the statistical analysis of both panels should be similar. As a result, the test of 
Hypothesis 2 will be done using the same statistical methodology as for Hypothesis 1.     
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4 Research Design 
 
 In order to empirically validate the previous assertions and investigate whether the 
degree of environmental risk management of a firm is linked to its cost of debt, I use a 
multiple regression analysis. Most of previous research about firm’s environmental 
performance (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Hamilton, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996) as 
well as firm’s cost of debt (Jiang, 2008; Sengupta, 1998; Ahmed et al, 2002) have used this 
design. It is the most appropriate method of analysis to study the dependence between a 
dependent metric variable (here the cost of debt, chosen to be a numerical variable) and 
several independent metric variables (here the control variables and the ERM proxy, 
which are all expected to be metric). It allows us to capture subtle causal relationship 
between variables, but also to build an equation that can be used to predict values of the 
dependent variable. The following model is used: 
 𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑡+1 = 𝑓  𝐸𝑅𝑀 𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠(𝑡)    (4.1) 
where CODt+1 is the cost of debt for the firm in year t+1 and ERMt is the level of 
environmental risk management in year t. 
 
4.1 Preliminary analysis: bond rating 
Some papers have used credit ratings of newly issued bonds to proxy for the 
firm’s cost of debt (Ahmed et al., 2002; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Kaplan and Urwitz, 
1979; Shi, 2003). Credit rating, measuring default risk, is a good proxy of a firm’s cost of 
debt (Jiang, 2008). However, it is a discrete and non-metric variable. A numerical 
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transformation can be performed so that bond ratings can fit in a multiple regression 
model as ordinal variables, but the discrete property remains. Because the effect of an 
environmental variable (such as environmental performance or environmental risk 
management) on the cost of debt is likely to be small, I posit that bond ratings may not 
succeed in capturing this effect with a discrete scale. Moreover, I posit that bond ratings 
carry the view that rating agencies have on environmental risks, rather than the view that 
investor have. So I use a more precise measure of investor’s view as the cost of debt 
measure (the initial bond yield spread). 
 The primary objective of bond rating is to reflect the risk that a firm could default 
on outstanding bonds. As such, it is based on several ratios that best represent the default 
risk: coverage ratio, leverage ratio, liquidity ratio, profitability ratio, and cashflow-to-debt 
ratios (Bodie et al., 2009). Given that the cost of debt is a function of default risk, several 
scholars (Jiang, 2008; Dhaliwal, 2008) have used bond ratings as a control variable to 
proxy for default risk in a multiple regression analysis: 
 𝐶𝑂𝐷 = 𝑓    𝐸𝑅𝑀 𝑡 , 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔   = 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘  ,
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠    
(4.2) 
I do not follow this approach in my analysis because Sharfman and Fernando (2008) 
found a significant positive effect of ERM on firm’s leverage. As a result, leverage must 
be incorporated in the analysis in order to tightly control for its variations. To avoid any 
interaction with leverage-based credit ratings, I choose a common set of control variables 
used in previous studies to replace bond ratings. Furthermore, Graham et al. (2001) found 
a negative relation between bond ratings and environmental liabilities. This indicates that 
rating agencies actually consider off-balance-sheet environmental liabilities when they rate 
a bond issue, and it is consistent with publicly disclosed criteria from rating agencies, 
stating that they take environmental liabilities into account (Standard & Poor’s, 2008). 
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Including ratings in my model could create interdependencies that would violate the 
assumptions of multiple regression analysis, because environmental information would be 
included in both the ERM proxy and the default risk proxy.  
 As a preliminary analysis however, it would be instructive to verify that bond 
ratings are indeed related to environmental liability information. Following Sengupta 
(1998), it can be done by evaluating the equation: 
 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡+1 = 𝑓  𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡  
 
(4.3) 
Besides verifying the work of Graham et al., this bond rating regression allows me to 
check that the control variables used to proxy the default risk of a firm (in lieu of bond 
ratings) capture this default risk effectively, and it would validate the main regression 
model. 
 
4.2 Panel and study period 
4.2.1 Panel for Hypothesis 1 and Preliminary Analysis 
Hypothesis 1 can be tested using public debt data. The panel of firms is chosen 
among US companies to ensure consistency in the legal treatment of environmental 
liabilities, which is country-specific, and to ensure that the effect of the CERCLA 
program is taken into account. Following Sharfman and Fernando (2008), I find that 
firms have to be large enough so that they may carry out a transparent environmental 
policy and environmental risk management (which is a long term resource-consuming 
plan, usually more implemented by bigger companies), but also have access to public debt 
markets (bond issue and private placement). As a result, I can obtain an accurate estimate 
of the cost of debt through publicly traded instruments, and it is likely that financial 
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information will be more easily available for larger firms. I chose to focus on firms drawn 
from the Standard and Poor’s S&P500 index: it is a comprehensive and large panel, which 
is close to the market benchmark. The contributing firms are also the largest in the U.S. 
market: they are more visible to investors, they often carry out more investments in 
environmental fields, and more data are available on them. Finally, most of the studies on 
environmental performance have used S&P 500 firms (Gluck et al., 2004; Konar and 
Cohen, 2001). 
As for the study period, it should avoid exceptional economic events such as a 
global economic downturn or recession, and be as recent as possible given the constraints 
on data availability. Most study on environmental performance used data available in the 
nineties, whereas most concerns on environmental investing really arose in early 2000. 
Finally, the period chosen should not contain major change in environmental policy or 
regulation, such as a change in CERCLA. The six-year period from year 2002 to 2007 
meets all these criteria and is retained for this study. 
As a result, I collect the firm sample from the S&P500 index at the beginning of 
year 2002. I exclude all the firms that are deleted from the index during the study period, 
as well as those which change of ticker (to avoid data collection problems). The resulting 
sample is then homogeneous over the period 2002-2007, which allows for comparison 
between two different years. Then, I only keep the firms that report on toxic chemical 
releases and waste management activities through the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory 
program (TRI) because TRI figures are used in the ERM assessment. TRI emissions that 
companies report should also be meaningful. It leads to the exclusion of financial and 
telecommunication firms, as well as firms operating in non-polluting sectors (food 
processing, services and distribution) or firms that manipulate very little amount of toxic 
chemicals. The intermediate sample results in 978 firm-year observations. 
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Then I collect data on the cost of debt in order to test Hypothesis 1 and conduct 
the preliminary analysis. Based on the measure of the cost of debt selected (the initial 
bond yield spread), the condition is that firm-year observations should have one valid 
bond issue in order to capture firm’s cost of debt. The main panel restriction comes from 
this cost of debt measurement. This condition leads to the removal of 770 firm-year 
observations that were useless because no cost of debt measure could be computed. 
Finally, the removal of outliers gave a final sample comprising 175 firm-year 
observations from 90 firms. Treatment of outliers will be detailed later in the analysis. The 
selection process is illustrated in table 4.1. 
  
 
4.2.2 Panel for Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 requires the use of data on commercial lending, that is to say bank 
debt data. However information on private transactions is not publicly disclosed. Such 
data should be collected from the financial accounts of individual firms, if the information 
is disclosed. According to Mazumdar and Sengupta (2005), some information on loan 
Table 4.1: Summary of the panel selection process and resulting number of firm-year observation 
available for the analysis of Hypothesis 1 
Selection Criteria  Number of firms
Firm-year observations in the S&P500 from 2001-2006,
with available financial information 2232 372 
Less:
Financial  and Telecommunication firms (324) (54)
Firms which are not required to report TRI (672) (112)
Firms which did not have meaningful TRI emissions (258) (43)
Firms which did not have a matching bond issue, valid and documented (770) (56)
Unusual observations (33) (17)
Final sample for regressions with Spread and Ratings 175 90 
Summary of Sample Selection
 Number of firm-year 
observations
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agreement can also be found in the Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan database. 
I did not have the resources to obtain such data in both cases. I tried to use the initial 
bond yield spread on public issues of secured (collateralized) bonds and mortgage bonds 
as a proxy for the cost of firm’s secured debt, but the final sample resulted in 11 cases. 
Such a small number could not allow the analysis to produce meaningful and reliable 
results, and one can observe that data on public secured debt is a rather flawed proxy for 
commercial debt (secured or not secured). So I was forced to limit the empirical analysis 
of the second hypothesis, and rely only on a descriptive analysis. The following sections 
of Research Design and Results exclusively address Hypothesis 1 and the 
preliminary analysis. Elements on Hypothesis 2 are added in section 5.7. 
 
 
4.3 Cost of debt measure 
Environmental criteria are not part of traditional Wall Street analytics known to 
influence the cost of debt. Moreover, the inconclusive analysis of Sharfman and Fernando 
indicates that the effect of environmental performance on the cost of debt is likely to be 
small, if any. That is why a continuous measure of the cost of debt should be chosen 
instead of a discrete measure. Cost of debt estimation and marginal cost of borrowing are 
not used because they are not considered proper measures of cost of debt according to 
the literature and business practice (Damodaran, 2001). So I choose the initial bond yield 
spread on the first issue of the year as a measure of the cost of debt:  it is the bond Yield 
to Maturity when bond is issued minus the yield on a treasury bond with comparable 
maturity. The spread is measured in basis points. In addition, Shiller and Modigliani 
(1979) indicate that yields on new issues are a more accurate measure of a firm’s cost of 
debt than yields on seasoned issues. The initial bond yield spread has been used as a 
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reliable cost of debt proxy in many other recent studies (Shi, 2003; Sengupta, 1998; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2008; Jiang, 2008; Benmelech and Bergman, 2009). One important benefit 
of the spread is that it captures the level of interest rates (the yield to maturity) but also 
controls for economic conditions by subtracting the appropriate T-bond yield. As the 
Treasury bond yield is considered the risk-free rate in the market and varies overtime 
depending on economic conditions, the spread only captures the risk premium offered by 
investors on bond issues, independently of market benchmark rates at the time of issue.   
Bonds are issued with many different features, such as fixed or floating rates, 
convertibility, call and put protections, or sinking fund feature. Based on previous 
literature, I collect the Spread of non-convertible, fixed rate and non-asset-backed bonds 
because those features create different categories of bonds that do not share the same 
type of investors and the same market behavior (Jiang, 2008). 
Investors can only rely on past and published information when determining the 
bond yield spread on a new issue, so there is the need to consider a lag between the 
publication of environmental/financial information and the cost of debt measurement. 
Following Ederington and Yawitz (1986), I select a one year lag. It means that bonds 
issued in year t+1 rely on financial and environmental information from year t. For 
companies with fiscal year ending in December (86% of the panel), it is important to note 
that the publication of fiscal year financial figures generally occurs in March. TRI data are 
also published around March. To be consistent with reporting periods, I only select bonds 
issued after the month of March to represent bonds of year t+1. Bonds issued prior to 
March are considered bonds of year t. A similar calendar is applied for the remaining 
companies: a bond issue belongs to year t+1 if it occurs at least three month after the end 
of fiscal year. Otherwise it belongs to year t because investors only have financial data 
from year t-1 available at the time of the issue.    
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For firms with multiple bond issue, I only select the first bond issue of the fiscal 
year t+1 (Shi, 2003; Sengupta 1998).   
 
4.4 Environmental Risk Management Measure 
4.4.1 The Environmental Risk Management framework 
There is no consensus among the scholars on environmental risk management 
measurement. Prior to building a new measure, it is important to understand what ERM 
represents. Environmental risk management, as part of a broader Corporate 
Environmental Management System, aims at dealing with environmental risks, which are 
events or conditions that can result in corporate reputation damage, and material or 
financial losses. Those risks may also prevent the company from achieving its business 
objectives. ERM encompasses technical risks, perceived risks by the public, and regulatory 
risks. Some scholars also argue that ERM should be seen as a mean of converting 
environmental risks into business opportunities (Fletcher and Paleologos, 1999). The 
environmental risk management framework is introduced in Figure 4.1. ERM starts with 
an assessment of risks and their consequences: the identification and analysis of all 
exposures to loss. Then alternatives to manage those risks are considered, either by risk 
control (technical solutions) or risk financing (insurance, sinking funds). 
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Figure 4.1: The Environmental Risk Management framework. Source: Darabaris (2008) 
 
In the meantime, environmental risks are analyzed using a strategic approach to identify 
potential opportunities, such as gains in resource efficiency. Finally, like most of risk 
management processes, the ERM framework includes a monitoring and feedback step in 
order to constantly update risk management techniques given the current situation. 
However one should notice that in the case of environmental risks, risks are often 
catastrophic, with direct (penalties) and indirect (reputation) costs. Risk financing methods 
tend to be very expensive or unavailable (Camarota and Dymond, 1996). This assertion 
seems to be borne out by the facts, as insurers of environmental liabilities have often 
changed their minds due to substantial losses (under CERCLA the average cost for 
cleaning up an NPL site had been estimated between $30 million and $40 million by the 
Insurance Services Office in 1995). As a result, the ERM framework promotes the control 
of environmental risks using a technical review of processes and more prevention of 
environmental damage, rather than relying on insurance and risk financing. One practical 
consequence of ERM implementation is that information on firm’s environmental 
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performance, actions and results should be gathered. Even if it is primarily done for 
internal use to support the ERM framework, it often contributes to an improvement in 
environmental communication towards investors or the public, thus addressing perceived 
risks by the public. In practice, a recent Economist Intelligence Unit survey of risk 
managers worldwide (Ruquet, 2008, p18) explains that managing environmental risks 
using an ERM framework is not yet widespread among firms: “While there are some 
companies that take environmental risk very seriously and have developed robust 
processes to identify, assess and mitigate their exposure, others continue to manage 
environmental risks in an ad hoc way and do not consider them when planning major 
strategic activities”. However most risk managers consider that they are successful in 
dealing with environmental regulation and identifying environmental liabilities. 
 
Indicators set up by the U.S. EPA for the Toxic Release Inventory and the 
Superfund program are the most widely used by scholars. For example, Hamilton (1995), 
King and Lenox (2002), Hart et Ahuja (1996), Konar et Cohen (2001) have used TRI 
figures to proxy for environmental performance. In particular, they have mostly 
considered the amounts of toxic chemicals disposed or released onsite, often referred to 
as “TRI emissions”. Garber and Hammitt (1998), Graham and al. (2001) and Barth and 
McNichols (1994) have used data from the Superfund program to proxy for 
environmental accidents and liabilities, such as the number of sites on the National 
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4.4.2 The National Priority List (NPL) 
Following CERCLA, the EPA was required to develop a method for assessing 
and ranking hazardous waste sites, based on hazard potential. The resulting list of sites, 
regularly updated because new sites are discovered and current sites are being remediated, 
is known as the Superfund Site Inventory (CERCLIS). It was topping 40000 sites in 1999 
(Bishop, 2000). When a site shows signs of environmental damage, it is listed on 
CERCLIS, until further pollution assessment is conducted by the EPA. Following this 
assessment and if hazardous pollution is found, the site is listed on the National Priority 
List (NPL). The NPL lists all high-ranking sites that are eligible for CERCLA federal 
funds (1650 sites as of February 2009). The process is summarized in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Summary of EPA site listing process and various public information systems on U.S. 
polluted sites 
 
 There is an online public access to CERCLIS database. In particular, when a site is placed 
on the NPL list, the public can track onsite operations as the site goes through the 
standard remedial procedure (see Figure 4.3 for further details): each site is the target of a 
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) in order to explore contamination at the 
site, the degree of contamination, potential effects on the environment and public health, 
and in order to propose feasible remedial designs. The EPA selects one of the proposed 
remediation plans and presents it as a Record of Decision (ROD). This plan is finally 
carried out by the potentially responsible parties (PRPs), or carried out by the EPA and 
billed to the PRPs (Bishop, 2000). This is a long and costly process: the time from 
hazardous waste discovery to initiation of cleanup is often 10 years or more, with an 
CORPORATE ERM AND                              FLORENT ROSTAING                                               2009                       c 




additional 10 to 20 years to carry out cleanup operations and final assessment. As a result, 
a NPL site often remains on the list for a few decades, and may damage the reputation of 
firms having “Superfund” sites.  
  
Figure 4.3: Sequence of events carried out for all identified NPL sites among the CERCLIS 
database. From Barth and McNichols (1994 - page 182) 
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4.4.3 The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) 
In addition to CERCLIS and NPL information systems, the EPA is also in charge 
of monitoring production and emission of hazardous substances in the US. Under the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, manufacturing 
facilities have been required to publicly disclose their use of hazardous substances in the 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). The first public disclosure of TRI emissions was made in 
June 1989, based on 1987 emissions. It concerns all manufacturing facilities in the US 
with 10 or more employees that produce or use chemicals on a list of around 300 
hazardous chemicals. Cohen et al. (1997, p 21) observe that at that time “public pressure 
followed immediately after the first disclosures, as environmental groups publicized the 
highest emitters and called for community-based protests”. Since then, TRI figures 
released on a yearly basis have become the best metric to measure firm’s waste generation 
and pollution. The program has expanded, covering more businesses and including more 
toxic chemicals. According to an EPA report (EPA, 2002), industries reporting TRI since 
its inception have reduced disposal and other releases of TRI chemicals by 49% during 
the 1987-2002 period.  
TRI must be reported at the facility level (there is no reporting by firm required), for 
facilities 
o Operating mainly in the manufacturing sector (SIC - Standard Industrial 
Classification - codes ranging 20 to 39) but also metal and coal mining (SIC 
codes 10, 12) and chemical wholesalers (SIC 5169) among others.    
o Employing 10 or more employees 
o Manufacturing or processing more than 25000 pounds of listed hazardous 
chemicals during the calendar year. 
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TRI report must include basic information about the facility (location, business, parent 
company), and the Form R that reports on management of chemical substances. The 
Form R is divided in three main sections (EPA, 2002): 
o Section 5 reports the amounts of toxic chemicals disposed of or otherwise 
released onsite to air, water, and land and injected underground. 
o Section 6 reports the amounts of chemicals transferred off-site for recycling, 
energy recovery, treatment to reduce toxicity, and disposal or release. 
o Section 8 reports production-related waste management information on 
quantities of TRI chemicals recycled, combusted for energy recovery, treated, 
or disposed of or otherwise released, both on and off-site. 
To some extent, data in Sections 5 and 6 and those in Section 8 of Form R represent a 
different view of the same information. It is important to note that section 8 of Form R 
was not part of the initial TRI requirements, and was added by the Pollution Prevention 
Act of 1990 in order to monitor source reduction (preventing the generation of waste). As 
such, it is not as popular as the very well screened and publicized Section 5. Combined, 
Section 5, Section 6 and Section 8 give a full overview of the way a facility treats its toxic 
production-related waste, as summarized in Figure 4.4. 
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I chose to focus on Section 8 of Form R because it gives a coherent and 
comprehensive view of toxic waste management in a firm. It summarizes all the quantities 
of TRI waste managed by facilities both on and off-site, unlike Section 5 which reports 
exclusively the on-site releases that could cause onsite pollution. Figure 4.5 summarizes 
the outputs that can be found in Section 8 of Form R for each facility: quantities of TRI 
chemicals recycled, combusted for energy recovery, treated, or disposed of or otherwise 




Figure 4.4: Distribution of information between the different Form R 
sections, regarding toxic waste production at facilities reporting the TRI. 
From EPA TRI Brochure 2006 
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hierarchy of waste management options established by the Pollution Prevention Act, in 
case source reduction cannot be implemented.  
 
Figure 4.5: Output available in Section 8 of Form R, and classified according to the waste 
management hierarchy (Pollution Prevention Act of 1990). Source: EPA (2002), page 21. 
 
The EPA explains that “although source reduction is the preferred method of reducing 
risk, environmentally sound recycling shares many of its advantages. Like source 
reduction, recycling reduces the need for treatment or disposal of waste and helps 
conserve energy and natural resources. Where source reduction and recycling are not 
feasible, waste can be treated. Disposal or other releases of a chemical is viewed as a last 
resort” (EPA, 2002, p21).  
Finally, it is important to note the chronology of the TRI reporting scheme. For 
each facility, reports on TRI release and waste management during the calendar year n are 
submitted to the EPA by July of the following year. They are then processed and verified 
by the EPA, and finally released to the public, along with reports and analysis, in the 
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beginning of the following year (year n+2) at best. Usually TRI Public Data Release 
reports are issued in March of year n+2, along with the financial results of most firms that 
have a n+1 fiscal year ending 31 December. From 2004 EPA has implemented a new 
program, called Electronic Facility Data Release (eFDR), that allows early public 
disclosure of raw TRI information, usually in October of year n+1. However raw data 
(per chemical per facility per usage) has to be processed in order to be meaningful. As a 
result, it is safe to consider that investors only get firm’s TRI data two years after the 
effective reporting year.  
 
4.4.4 The ISO 14001 environmental management standard 
To proxy for environmental risk management, I also consider one of the best 
auditing schemes promoting ERM worldwide. It is the standard ISO 14001, from the ISO 
14000 environmental management standards developed by the International Organization 
for Standardization. The goal of ISO 14000 standards is to provide business management 
with a mechanism to measure and manage environmental risks and impacts. Its main 
standard, ISO 14001, provides a framework for assessing, managing, and reducing the 
liabilities associated with environmental aspects of operations (Voorhees and Woellner, 
1998). ISO 14001 standard “encourages entities to move from risk financing into 
comprehensive risk control activities” (Camarota and Dymond, 1996). It follows a “Plan, 
Do, Check” model for business improvement, and relies on a few core principles: 
commitment to comply with relevant regulations, planning priorities and objectives, 
implementation with proper resources allocation, internal auditing to measure progress 
with third-party verification, commitment to continual improvement, and finally 
development of environmental documentation.  
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It should also be noticed that a program conducted by the U.S. EPA during the 
nineties, the EPA’s Merit Program, has relied on ISO 14001 case studies to show how 
environmental risk management systems could reduce the cost of capital, by improving 
both environmental performance and economic competitiveness among U.S. businesses. 
“By implementing an ISO 14001 environmental management system, a business can 
demonstrate to lenders that it meets or exceeds accepted lending standards in all respects, 
thus ensuring access to capital and maintaining credits positive relations with lending 
institutions” (Voorhees and Woellner, 1998, p158). Several promising examples 
sponsored by the program were published in technology transfer documents. Another 
aspect of the case study program has also looked at the reduction in insurance premium 
payable by firms upon the implementation of an environmental management program. 
 
4.4.5 Selecting the ERM measures 
Having analyzed the ERM framework and available data, I use information from 
the previous sections to build ERM measures. As highlighted by Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008), environmental risk management is a rather elusive notion, or at least a 
multifaceted one. To find variables that could proxy this concept, I refer to the process of 
ERM detailed previously: after risk is assessed, risk management consists of risk financing 
and risk control, with usually a focus on risk control because little financial insurance is 
available for catastrophic environmental damage. The framework also comprises a 
commitment to process review and continual improvement. I choose to group five 
different measures together to capture the level of ERM in a company. They are based on 
the indicators detailed previously:   
o ENV-WASTE: total toxic production-related waste as reported in Section 8 
of TRI form R, standardized by the firm’s domestic (U.S.) revenue. This 
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measure is in pound of toxic chemical per dollar of sales. Based on the total 
waste figure provided by the TRI, it measures the ability to use source 
reduction as a technical mean of controlling environmental risks. If less toxic 
waste is produced, it mechanically decreases the risk of environmental 
damage. 
o ENV-REL: total weight of toxic chemicals released in the environment with 
or without pre-treatment divided by toxic production-related waste. It is the 
percentage of total production-related toxic waste that is released in the 
environment, as depicted in Figure 4.5. This measure is based on Form R 
figures, and is very close to the “TRI emissions” measure used by other 
scholars. It measures a firm’s risk of pollution and environmental damage 
through the release of toxic material in the environment. As a result, it is also 
an indicator of potential environmental liabilities that may arise. 
o ENV-NRJ: total weight of toxic chemicals recycled or used for energy 
recovery on or off-site, divided by toxic production-related waste. It is the 
percentage of total production-related toxic waste that can be reused through 
recycling or used for energy recovery (mainly thermal production) as depicted 
in Figure 4.5. This measure is based on Form R figures. It measures a firm’s 
ability to control environmental risks and modify its production process in 
order to produce more recyclable/reusable material, and to turn toxic waste 
production to good account through profitable energy recovery. 
One can observe that ENV-NRJ and ENV-REL and linked. ENV-NRJ is the 
percentage of toxic waste that is recycled, and ENV-REL is the percentage of 
toxic waste that is released in the environment. Let us consider the measure 
ENV-TREAT: it is the amount of toxic chemical sent for toxicity-reduction 
treatment, divided by toxic production-related waste. Based on Figure 4.5, the 
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sum of ENV-REL, ENV-NRJ and ENV-TREAT is equal to 100%. ENV-
TREAT is not used in the analysis to avoid multicollinearity problems, but can 
be easily computed using values of ENV-NRJ and ENV-REL.     
o ENV-ISO: dummy variable indicating that a company has at least one facility 
which is ISO14001 certified during the year of study. ISO 14001 is the 
international standard for environmental management. I use it as a measure 
because it indicates that certified companies have a written environmental 
policy with planned environmental objectives and measurable targets, a third-
party auditing, and a commitment to continual review and improvement of 
ERM. 
o ENV-NPL: number of Superfund sites currently named in the NPL list for 
the firm at the time of the study. It measures the actual success of the ERM 
policy in place by looking at major environmental accidents. It is also a 
measure of past and current environmental liabilities, because Potential 
Responsible Parties (PRPs) under CERCLA have to finance cleanup 
operations, which often last for 10 to 20 years. Previous studies using 
Superfund exposure have found that the measure “number of sites in the NPL 
where the firm is listed” is the most significant one, and can alone represent 
Superfund exposure (Garber and Hammitt, 1998; Graham et al., 2001). 
All measures are publicly disclosed and easily available through online databases and 
companies’ websites. They are also widely known among the investor’s community. It is 
important to note that for the measures ENV-WASTE, ENV-REL and ENV-NRJ, TRI 
data are made available to public at best 9 months after the end of the year studied, and 
are fully released one year and three months later. So when investors evaluate ERM in 
year t+1 (when bond is issued), they only have the TRI data from year t-1 available since 
the end of year t. As a result, I collect TRI data using a two year lag. The NPL List and 
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ISO certifications are updated very frequently so I collect the remaining data on a yearly 
basis using a one year lag with the cost of debt measure. 
 
4.5 Control variables 
Given that the regression model uses the cost of debt as dependent variable, it is 
necessary to control for various parameters that impact the initial bond yield spread. 
Based on the studies of Jiang (2008), Sengupta (1998), Shi (2003) and Dhaliwal et al. 
(2008), I use the following control variables to account for 
o Bond issue characteristics, in year t+1 when bond is issued:  
o IssueSize: natural logarithm of the size of the bond issue (in millions 
of dollars) 
o Maturity: natural logarithm of years to maturity. Longer maturity has 
an influence on risk exposure 
o Callable: dummy variable for call provisions. Takes the value 1 if 
there is no call provision, and 0 if the bond is callable from the date of 
issuance 
o Junk: dummy variable to account for the difference between 
investment-grade debt and speculative grade debt. Takes the value 0 if 
the issue is rated as investment-grade (rating that equals BBB-, or 
better) and 1 otherwise, for junk bonds rated as speculative (rating 
equals BB+ or less) 
 
o Issuer characteristics, in year t before the bond is issued (this is mainly to 
proxy for default risk and replace the bond rating variable): 
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o LnTimes: natural logarithm of (1+ times-interest-earned ratio), where 
the times-interest-earned ratio is the ratio EBIT/Interest charges 
Note: Times, the Times-interest-earned ratio is initially used in the 
analysis and replaced because of its non-normal distribution that 
weakens the analysis. 
o Size: natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year 
o Leverage: book value of long term debt divided by the market value 
of equity, at the end of year t 
o Margin: Net income divided by net sales 
o StdRet: Standard deviation of firm’s monthly stock return over the 
year. It is a proxy for market risk 
o Industry dummies: GICS 15, GICS 25, GICS 30, GICS 35, GICS 
45, GICS 55 to control for industry differences. 
 
o Macro-economic conditions, in year t+1 when bond is issued: 
o BC (Business cycle): the difference between the average yield on 
Moody’s Aaa bonds and the average yield of ten-year U.S. Treasury 
bonds for the month of issue. It should capture the time series 
variations in risk premium over the business cycle. The spread already 
controls for economic conditions and level of risk-free rates. But 
variations in risk premium should be handled.  
 
Finally, I control for industry differences among the panel. The panel is supposed to be 
heterogeneous as it is drawn from a major market index. Following the accounting and 
finance literature (Bradley et al., 1984; Morck et al., 1988) and recent papers on 
environmental and financial performance (Graham et al., 2001) I include dummy variables 
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to account for industry differences. In a recent work, Semenova and Hassel (2008) cast 
light on strong industry differences on the environmental performance field, in particular 
between high risk industries (energy, materials, utilities) and low risk industries (retailing, 
healthcare). Their study is based on a panel of firms belonging to the MSCI World Index, 
which embraces most firms of the smaller S&P 500 index, and is conducted during the 
2003-2006 period. They use the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) to 
differentiate between industries. Because of the important similarities with the panel and 
period I use here, I choose to rely on the same industry classification in order to benefit 
from their results. Moreover, the GICS classification allows the manipulation of all 
industries using a maximum of 10 industry dummies. Following the panel treatment the 
final sample comprises 7 sectors according to the GICS classification, so I use 6 industry 
dummies and take the GICS 20 category as the reference category (with no dummy). 
Industries are presented in table 4.2. 
   
 
Table 4.2: Sample composition according to the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) 
GICS code Industry Number of cases
15 2820, 2950 Materials 27
20 35--, 36-- Industrials 43
25 3585-3690 Consumer Discretionary 19
30 20-- Consumer Staples 30
35 2836-2844 Health Care 24
45 3570-3579 Information Technology 4
55 4911, 4931, 4939 Utilities 28
Total issues 175
Sample composition according to GICS classification
Approximate equivalent 
SIC codes
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Data mentioned in the previous sections are collected from the following databases: 
o Standard and Poor’s website (www.standardandpoors.com) for S&P 500 index 
composition and industry classification: Industry dummies 
o SDC Platinum Global Corporate Finance database for data on new bond 
issues: Spread, Rating, IssueSize, Maturity, Callable, Junk  
o Right-to-Know Network (RTK net, www.rtknet.org) online database for TRI 
aggregated figures: ENV-NRJ, ENV-REL, ENV-WASTE  
o Firms’ websites for information on ISO 14001 certification: ENV-ISO 
o U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the National Priority List 
(www.epa.gov): ENV-NPL 
o COMPUSTAT for financial data: LnTimes, Size, Leverage, Margin 
o Bloomberg for market data: StdRet 
o U.S. Federal Reserve (www.research.stlouisfed.org) for macro-economic data: 
BC 
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5.1 Computation of the ERM measure 
My objective is to study environmental risk management as a single framework. So 
I test whether the five ERM measures selected (ENV-WASTE, ENV-REL, ENV-NRJ, 
ENV-ISO, ENV-NPL) could be summarized into a single environmental risk 
management indicator. This indicator would then be incorporated in the regression. Apart 
from simplifying the analysis, it would also demonstrate convergent validity in the 
measure: if data can be summarized based on common variance, it means that companies 
consider all the aspects of ERM when implementing the framework. For example, it 
means that companies would promote source reduction (ENV-WASTE), “end-of-pipe” 
treatment (ENV-NRJ) and third-part auditing (ENV-ISO) altogether. 
So I run an exploratory factor analysis to find a common factor that would best 
combine the environmental data. The exploratory analysis is made using a principal 
components analysis with a Varimax rotation. The results are reported in table 5.1. 
Factors retained in the analysis are selected using “Kaiser’s rule”. This rule states that only 
factors whose eigenvalue is greater than 1 should be retained (Mertler and Vannatta, 
2005). An eigenvalue is defined as the amount of total variance explained by each factor, 
and the total amount of variability equals the number original variables in the analysis.  
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Table 5.1: Output of the first factor analysis using ERM measures 
ENV-NPL ENV-NRJ ENV-REL ENV-WASTE
ENV-ISO Correlation 0.077 0.311** -0.172* -0.135*
Sig. (1-tailed) (0.155) (0.000) (0.011) (0.036)
ENV-NPL Correlation 0.138* -0.055 0.028
Sig. (1-tailed) (0.034) (0.235) (0.357)
ENV-NRJ Correlation -0.592** -0.120
Sig. (1-tailed) (0.000) (0.056)
ENV-REL Correlation 0.121
Sig. (1-tailed) (0.056)
**. Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*. Correlation is signif icant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure = 0.566
Significance of Bartlett's Test = 0.000
1 1.832 36.631 36.631
2 1.032 20.647 57.278
3 0.929 18.580 75.858
4 0.822 16.450 92.308







Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Factor loadings
 Rotation Method: Varimax
Eigenvalues % of Variance explained
Total Variance Explained
Rotated Component Matrix and Communalities
Cumulative % of variance 
explained
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Factor
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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 However, correlation coefficients between those five variables are rather weak in 
value and significance, except for the pair ENV-REL and ENV-NRJ, and the pair ENV-
NRJ and ENV-ISO. This lack of correlation does not impact the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure and Bartlett’s test of sphericity: a KMO measure above 0.5 indicates that patterns 
of correlations are relatively compact and that factor analysis should yield distinct and 
reliable factors, and a significant Bartlett’s test indicates that correlation coefficients are 
significantly greater than zero, and that factor analysis is appropriate. But it impacts the 
attempt to summarize the five measures into one: the Communalities table shows that 
two post-extraction communalities have values below 0.6. Communalities represent the 
proportion of variability of a given variable that is explained by the extracted factors 
(Agresti and Finlay, 1997). Field (2009) reports that for samples size with less than 200 
observations, which is the case here, the presence of any communality below 0.6 results in 
the Kaiser’s rule to be not fully accurate. It also means that the extracted factors hardly 
represent the two measures with low communalities, ENV-ISO and ENV-WASTE. As a 
result, the attempt to select a single factor based on Kaiser’s rule cannot be statistically 
justified. The other usual criterion is to look at the variance explained by factors, and to 
retain factors that together can explain at least 70% of it (Stevens, 1992). In this case, the 
first three factors should be retained here. Two factors are selected using Kaiser’s rule, but 
the third and fourth factor have an eigenvalue close to 1 and are explaining almost the 
same amount of variance as well. It indicates that one single factor is not fully appropriate 
to summarize the information contained in those five variables, and that three or four 
factors would be required to avoid an important loss of information. This supports the 
correlation analysis stating that some correlation coefficients are rather low in value. As a 
result, the concept of an integrated ERM framework that would influence all the selected 
measures in the same direction does not seem to be verified empirically among the panel 
of companies. It means that companies do not seem to consider environmental risk 
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management solutions altogether, for example where ISO 14001 certifications would be 
obtained while a plan of risk control and toxic waste reduction would be implemented. 
Instead, empirical results suggest that companies decide case by case if they need to 
acquire ISO 14001 certifications, or invest in toxic waste reduction. The implementation 
of ISO 14001 framework seems to have only a moderate effect on technical improvement 
of production processes (through more recycling and energy recovery, and less releases of 
toxic material in the environment). Those results could be explained using the survey of 
Ruquet (2008) which finds that companies are managing environmental risks in an ad hoc 
way. Yet it is not possible to conclude on this issue using solely those empirical facts. One 
should note that these findings are consistent with the work of Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008): they retain one factor to summarize all the ERM measures, and this factor 
accounts for only 43% of the variance in their environmental data. It tends to show that 
their ERM measures are not strongly correlated as well. 
 
 Following this empirical analysis, I choose to only group the environmental 
variables that strongly correlate, and otherwise use the other variables as independent 
measures in the main regression analysis.  
The pair ENV-REL and ENV-NRJ has the highest Pearson correlation coefficient, 
according to the analysis in table 5.1. This pair was expected to be correlated because 
those two variables both illustrate the post-treatment of output toxic waste stream by the 
firm, as depicted in Figure 4.5. Therefore, the sum of these two measures, added to the 
percentage of toxic waste sent for post-treatment by the firm, is expected to be 100%. 
Using again an exploratory factor analysis, I empirically test the possibility of summarizing 
the information contained in ENV-REL and ENV-NRJ with a single variable. I use again 
a principal component analysis. No rotation technique is needed because one single factor 
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is extracted. Kaiser’s rule is again chosen to be the standard rule of factor selection. The 
results of this factor analysis using ENV-REL and ENV-NRJ is reported in table 5.2. 
 
    
Because of their high correlation, the pair ENV-REL and ENV-NRJ can easily be 
summarized in one factor using factor analysis: KMO and Bartlett test indicate that factor 
analysis should be satisfactory and reliable. The communalities being all above 0.7 and the 
number of variables to factor being less than 30, Kaiser’s rule in this case is accurate 
(Stevens, 1992). Following this rule, one factor accounting for almost 80% of the variance 
explained is extracted. The factor’s loadings on the original variables indicate that this 
factor is positively correlated to ENV-NRJ and negatively correlated to ENV-REL. A 
high value of the factor indicates a more environmentally-friendly management of toxic 
waste output, with a high rate of waste being recycled or reused for energy production 
and a lower rate of waste being released in the environment. Therefore I call this factor 
Table 5.2: Output of the second factor analysis, using the measures ENV-REL and ENV-NRJ 
Total
% of Variance 
explained
Cumulative % of 
variance 
explained Total
% of Variance 
explained
Cumulative % of 
variance 
explained
1 1.592 79.611 79.611 1.592 79.611 79.611
2 0.408 20.389 100.000
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure = 0.500





Rotated Component Matrix and Communalities
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Total Variance Explained
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
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ENV-OUTPUT and I use it, along with the other measures ENV-WASTE, ENV-ISO, 
ENV-NPL, in the regression analysis. 
 
5.2 Data treatment 
Data are collected from the databases mentioned in section 4.6. TRI figures are 
retrieved from the RTK (Right-to-Know Network) website. TRI data are originally 
reported by U.S. facilities, not by U.S. firms. But facilities also report the Dun & 
Bradstreet number (a 9 digit number that is supposed to uniquely identify each U.S. 
company) of their parent company. The RTK (Right-to-Know Network) online database 
aggregates TRI data by parent firm by matching Dun & Bradstreet numbers, and is 
therefore used in this study. For every U.S. firm and for every TRI measure (waste 
produced, released in the environment, etc.), the RTK database directly provide the sum 
of all similar measures, in pound, across all firm’s facilities. 
Once all data have been collected and the ERM factor ENV-OUTPUT 
computed, I use the SPSS statistical software to conduct a pre-analysis data screening. 
Given that financial and environmental data are drawn from a large sample of 
heterogeneous companies, and that those data carry much more information than I can 
study or control in this analysis, some firm-year observations are likely to be outliers. 
Graphical analysis using plots of residual values and statistical analysis using Mahalanobis 
distance (Stevens, 1992) confirms that an important number of observations are far from 
the main pattern. However those values each illustrate an empirical case and carry some 
information that may still be useful in the analysis. As a result, I do not delete those 
outliers based on purely mathematical criteria because it may lead to a biased analysis 
where only average values would be introduced in the regression. Instead, I follow the 
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approach of Chen et al. (2003) that focuses on influential observations, instead of purely 
statistical outliers. Influential observations are the product of both outlierness and 
leverage: 
o Outliers are observations with a large residual, meaning that the dependent 
variable (here the spread) has an unusual value given the values of the 
predictors. 
o Leverage refers to an observation with an extreme value on a predictor 
variable. It has an unusually large effect on the estimate of regression 
coefficients. 
Such influential observations threaten the analysis because they force regression results to 
represent off-the-pattern values, even if those values are empirically justified. I use SPSS 
graphical solutions to analyze influential observations on a case by case basis. In 
particular, I analyze the scatterplot of centered leverage values by the studentized deleted 
residuals, and I delete observations that appear out of range for the regression analysis. I 
use a cut-off value of 0.24 for leverage values, following the criteria of (2k+2)/n where k 
is the number of predictors and n the number of observations. Following Chen et al. 
(2003), I also use a cut-off value of 2 for studentized deleted residuals. 
The assumptions of univariate linearity, multivariate linearity and homoscedasticity 
are assessed using graphical methods (Field, 2009; Mertler and Vannatta, 2005). The pre-
analysis of normality points out that the distribution of Times (the times-interest-earned 
ratio that proxies for firm’s coverage capabilities) is strongly different from a normal 
distribution. As a result, I follow Jiang (2008) and use the variable LnTimes, natural 
logarithm of (1+Times) that corrects the non-normality effect of the initial variable. 
Finally, I convert the Standard and Poor’s bond rating letters into numerical 
ratings that can be introduced in a regression analysis, in order to conduct the preliminary 
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analysis detailed in section 4.1. Based on the panel, some rating categories are merged to 
balance the frequency of cases between the different categories. This is to ensure that the 
regression has a high level of power (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996; Mertler and Vannatta, 





Table 5.3: Rating conversion table 
S&P Credit Rating Letter
Theoretical 
conversion table
Bond Rating Variable 
used (after merging 
some categories)
AAA 1 2
AA + 2 2
AA 3 3
AA - 4 4
A + 5 5
A 6 6
A - 7 7
BBB + 8 8
BBB 9 9
BBB - 10 9
BB + 11 10
BB 12 10
BB - 13 10
B + 14 10
B 15 10
B - 16 10
CCC 17 10
Conversion table of S&P ratings
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5.3 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Descriptive statistics based on the sample of 175 firm-year observations are 
presented in Table 5.4, along with a definition of all variables used. The mean Spread for 
the panel is 110.77 basis points, indicating that on average S&P 500 companies have to 
pay interests of 1% over the treasury benchmark. However a standard deviation of 55bp 
indicates an important amount of variability in the cost of debt measure. Rating figures 
and data on the Junk variable indicate that most companies issue investment-grade bonds, 
and most have a A rating or better. Bond issue size varies around the standard amount of 
$500 millions, with an average maturity of 10 to 15 years. The measures ENV-REL and 
ENV-NRJ indicate that some companies manage to recycle all the waste they produce, 
while some have to fully release it in the environment. On average, companies tend to 
recycle more and release relatively less waste, although the breakdown is close to 30% of 
waste managed for each method. The range of ENV-WASTE is substantial, but there 
seems to be only a few high values. Measures also indicate that most of NPL sites are 
detained by few firms, while almost half of the panel has an ISO14001 certification in 
place.    
  
5.4 Pearson correlations 
Pearson bivariate correlations and the significance levels (two-tailed t-tests) are 
reported in Table 5.5. The dummy variable ENV-ISO is included in order to have an 
overview of the regression results. Empirical results indicate that spread increases with 
leverage and the market risk (represented by StdRet), and decreases when companies have 
a higher profitability (a higher Margin coefficient) and a higher coverage ratio (LnTimes). 
One can note that firm size does not seem to have a significant influence on the spread 
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paid, probably because S&P500 companies in the sample are among the largest of their 
categories and therefore they benefit from favourable borrowing conditions in the market. 
More important, correlations between the spread and environmental variables reveal that 
only ENV-OUTPUT is strongly correlated to Spread at the 5% level. ENV-OUTPUT is 
negatively correlated to Spread, indicating that a higher level of ENV-OUTPUT (so a 
higher level of recycling and a lower level of releases, see table 5.2) may lead to a lower 
cost of debt, although the regression analysis has to be carried out to confirm it. The 
correlation sign of ENV-WASTE is also as expected because more production of toxic 
waste should increase the spread, although this correlation is not significant, even at the 
10% level. The two other correlations have the expected signs, with the presence of 
ISO14001 certification leading to a lower spread, whereas past environmental damage and 
liabilities logically increase the risk and this increase the spread. However, they are 
completely non-significant, indicating that a majority of investors do not seem to consider 
those aspects of ERM. Still, those correlations should be clarified by the regression 
analysis. 
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics and variable definitions 
Descriptive Statistics (N=175)
Variables Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std. Dev.
Spread (basis point) 10.00 327.00 97.00 110.77 55.90
Rating (number) 2.00 10.00 6.00 6.27 2.16
IssueSize* ($M) 35.00 4000.00 500.00 620.34 551.79
Maturity* (years) 2.03 40.61 10.16 14.69 9.78
Times* -0.80 61.45 7.13 10.21 11.11
Size* ($M) 2055.70 135695.00 15416.27 20597.72 19734.15
Leverage 0.00 3.56 0.20 0.34 0.40
Margin -0.21 0.40 0.08 0.08 0.07
StdRet (% return) 0.02 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.03
BC (% return) 0.64 2.38 1.35 1.32 0.49
ENV-OUTPUT -1.83 1.61 0.05 0.00 1.00
ENV-REL (%) 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.31 0.30
ENV-NRJ (%) 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.35 0.34
ENV-WASTE (lbs/$) 0.18 167665.22 1329.03 6882.08 16744.47
ENV-NPL (number) 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.26 0.71
Callable (dummy) 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.21 0.40
Junk (dummy) 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.24
ENV-ISO (dummy) 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 0.49
*. Value of measure before log is applied for analysis
Spread Yield to maturity on first debt issued in year t + 1 minus the yield on US T-bond with closest maturity
Rating S&P Rating of the bond issue in year t + 1, converted in numerical variable
IssueSize Natural log of the size of the bond issue
Maturity Natural log of years to maturity
LnTimes Natural log of 1+Times-interest-earned ratio (which is the ratio EBIT on Interest charges) at the end
of year t
Size Natural log of total assets at the end of year t
Leverage Book value of long term debt divided by market value of equity, at the end of year t
Margin Net income divided by net sales
StdRet Standard deviation of firm’s monthly stock return over the year
BC Difference between the average yield on Moody’s Aaa bonds and the average yield of ten-year
U.S. Treasury bonds for the month of issue
ENV-OUTPUT Factor summarizing the end-of-pipe treatment of toxic waste. A high value indicates that more waste
is recycled or used for energy treatment (ENV-NRJ), and less waste is released (ENV-REL), in year t-1
ENV-WASTE Amount of toxic waste produced for the year t-1, standardized by domestic sales
ENV-NPL Number of production sites on the National Priority List in year t
Callab le Dummy variable for call provisions. 1 if no call provision, 0 otherwise
Junk Dummy variable for speculative grade bonds (with ratings below BBB-). 1 if the bond is graded as 
speculative
ENV-ISO Dummy variable indicating if a company is ISO14001 certified. 1 if a company has at least one
certified production site
Industry Dummies Dummies to control for industry effects, using the 2-digit GICS classification
(GICS 15, GICS 25, 
GICS 30, GICS 35, 
GICS 45, GICS 55)
Variable definitions
Descriptive Statistics
CORPORATE ERM AND                              FLORENT ROSTAING                                               2009                       c 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.5: Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients 
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5.5 Preliminary analysis 
The dependent variable in this regression analysis, bond rating, is considered a 
categorical and ordinal variable because its multiple classes can be ranked, from the safest 
bond issue to the riskiest. Thus I use ordinal regression, also known as Polytomous 
Universal Model (PLUM) provided by SPSS and based on McCullagh (1980), and I 
estimate the following equation, based on equation 4.3: 
 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡+1
+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 +∝9 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 15 +∝10 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 25 +∝11 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 30
+∝12 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 35 +∝13 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 45
+∝14 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 55+𝛼15𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛼16𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑡−1
+ 𝛼17𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑡 + 𝛼18𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
(5.1) 
 
Results of the ordinal regression that empirically estimates equation 5.1 are 
presented in table 5.6.  
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Table 5.6 shows the coefficient estimates (the “α” of equation 5.1), the Wald χ2 
used to test the statistical significance of each coefficient in the model and the significance 
of the χ2 statistics. The Wald χ2 test statistic is the squared ratio of the coefficient estimate 
to the standard error of the respective predictor. It is the ordinal regression equivalent of 
the t-test in the OLS regression, and they both test the null hypothesis that the individual 
predictor's regression coefficient is zero given the rest of the predictors in the model. The 
level of significance is the p-value of this null hypothesis. This level should be below the 
chosen level of significance for this study, α=5%, for the coefficient to be considered 
Table 5.6: Regression results of the effect of ERM variables on bond ratings 
Variables
IssueSize* 0.516 5.212 0.022
Maturity -0.143 0.386 0.535
Callable -0.017 0.002 0.965
LnTimes* -0.854 4.643 0.031
Size** -1.123 20.498 0.000
Leverage** 3.376 9.158 0.002
Margin** -12.650 10.513 0.001
StdRet** 24.523 14.409 0.000
ENV-OUTPUT -0.114 0.278 0.598
ENV-WASTE 0.000 0.170 0.680
ENV-ISO 0.158 0.250 0.617
ENV-NPL* 0.459 4.041 0.044
**. Signif icant at the 0.01 level
*. Signif icant at the 0.05 level
Pseudo R
2









Ordinal regression (PLUM) of Bond Rating on ERM and control variables
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different from 0. The ordinal regression fit is assessed using the Cox and Snell pseudo R2, 
an imitation of the OLS R2 based on the likelihood, and using the likelihood ratio test of 
model fitting, a χ2 test that should be significant. As one can observe, the likelihood ratio 
is highly significant, indicating a well-fitting model. This is confirmed by the R2 of 0.687.  
 The first objective of this preliminary analysis is to check that the control variables 
used to proxy the default risk of a firm (in lieu of bond ratings) capture this default risk 
effectively. Coefficient estimates indicate that all control variables except Maturity and 
Callable are significant at the 5% level. Results obtained for Maturity and Callable are not 
surprising because bond ratings mostly rely on issuer ratings, that is to say the firm long-
term credit rating. So most bond issue ratings do not adapt to such issue-specific features. 
More important, all the other control variables, especially the one controlling for default 
risk (LnTimes, Size, Leverage, Margin, StdRet) are highly significant. Those variables are 
then a good alternative to bond ratings to proxy for default risk, and can be used in the 
main regression analysis.  
 The second objective is to test whether bond ratings carry environmental 
information, and especially environmental liabilities as illustrated by the work of Graham 
et al. (2001). This preliminary analysis reveals very interesting results: of the four ERM 
measures, only the measure ENV-NPL is significant at the 5% level. The three other 
measures are all highly non-significant, and it is likely that they do not influence the 
ordinal regression much. This analysis confirms that bond ratings carry some 
environmental information on past environmental liabilities (Graham et al., 2001). 
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5.6 Regression results 
I then test the first and main hypothesis by estimating the following regression 
equation, using a standard OLS regression design: 
 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡+1
+ 𝛼4𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑡+1 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 +∝10 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 15 +∝11 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 25
+∝12 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 30 +∝13 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 35 +∝14 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 45 +∝15 𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑆. 55
+ 𝛼16𝐵𝐶𝑡+1 +∝17 𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛼18𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑡−1
+ 𝛼19𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑡 +∝20 𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡  
(5.2) 
 
I estimate the equation 5.2 using an OLS multiple regression, with the Spread as 
the numerical dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 5.7. 
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IssueSize** 15.356 0.218 0.001 1.675
Maturity** 12.252 0.143 0.008 1.187
Callable* 16.928 0.123 0.029 1.281
Junk** 71.753 0.312 0.000 2.515
LnTimes -11.960 -0.183 0.069 4.156
Size -6.484 -0.099 0.174 2.193
Leverage* 26.161 0.189 0.040 3.445
Margin* -153.068 -0.196 0.022 2.998
StdRet* 335.239 0.162 0.015 1.796
BC 8.562 0.074 0.216 1.494
ENV-OUTPUT* -9.790 -0.175 0.024 2.443
ENV-WASTE -0.0003 -0.102 0.100 1.566
ENV-ISO -4.077 -0.036 0.512 1.269
ENV-NPL -0.598 -0.008 0.894 1.358
**. Signif icant at the 0.01 level







Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Significance
Regression 342148.268 20 17107.413 13.067 0.000
Residual 201623.126 154 1309.241
Total 543771.394 174
Multiple regression of Spread on ERM and control variables
ANOVA
Table 5.7: Regression results of the effects of ERM variables on the cost of debt 
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Table 5.7 shows the coefficients, the model fit and the Analysis of Variance test 
(ANOVA). The adjusted R2 value of 0.581 indicates that the model is satisfying given that 
investors rely on a high number of quantitative and qualitative factors when granting a 
certain level of interest rates, and that only a few critical control variables can be 
introduced in the analysis. The ANOVA table reports the overall significance of the 
model. Significance of the test is below the desired level of 5%, and even 0.1%, so we can 
conclude that the independent variables reliably predict the dependent variable, and that 
the model is appropriate. Finally, the Durbin-Watson statistic tests for serial correlation of 
the residuals, also called auto-correlation or errors. The analysis is not a real time-series 
analysis, but the presence of firm-year observations over the same period of time (2002-
2007) could cause problems of auto-correlation that should be estimated. Statistical tables 
indicate that in our case the upper confidence bound is 1.883 and the lower confidence 
bound is 1.474. Auto-correlation is rejected when the Durbin-Watson statistic is above 
the upper bound, whereas auto-correlation is suspected below the lower bound. Because 
1.800 lies in the indecision area I have to adopt the conservative approach and conclude 
that there is no problem of auto-correlation in the analysis (Evans, 2009). 
Given that the model summary indicates a proper model fit and that ERM and 
control variables significantly predict the cost of debt, we can consider the regression 
results in Table 5.7. This table presents the unstandardized coefficients, which are the 
values of the “α” estimates in the equation 5.2. The standardized coefficients are the 
values for a regression equation if all of the variables are standardized to have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one (Chen et al., 2003). In this case all the standardized 
variables have the same unit, and those standardized coefficients can be compared 
altogether. 
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Variables controlling for the bond issue specifications are all significant at the 5% 
level, indicating that bond features are of great concerns for investors. The variables 
chosen to proxy for default risk and tested in the preliminary analysis are also significant, 
except for the size of the firm. In particular, firms with a higher leverage or higher market 
volatility have to pay higher interest rates on outstanding bonds. The fact that the size 
measure is non-significant has probably much to do with the choice of the panel. S&P 
500 index specifically targets the largest firms in the U.S. market, with an average market 
capitalization of $13.9 billion per company as of March 2009. The Business Cycle (BC) 
measure is also non-significant, indicating potentially weak time-series variations of risk 
premium between the different bond issues. It confirms that the study period chosen, 
2002-2007, is a period of market stability. It translates into rather uniform borrowing 
conditions on debt markets.  
The regression results for ERM variables, our topic of interest in this paper, reveal 
strong differences between variables. One should remember that those variables could 
not be computed into a single one using empirical results. Only the ENV-OUTPUT 
variable, which represents the end-of-pipe treatment of toxic waste made by companies, is 
significant at the 5% level. ENV-WASTE is the second most influential environmental 
variable, with a significance level of 10%. The two other variables have very low 
significance levels and standardized coefficients, and cannot be taken into account in the 
analysis according to statistical procedures. As explained in section 5.1, the ENV-
OUTPUT variable is computed using the following formula: 
 𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇 = 0.892 𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝑁𝑅𝐽 − 0.892 𝐸𝑁𝑉. 𝑅𝐸𝐿 
 
(5.3) 
So the negative sign of the ENV-OUTPUT coefficient in table 5.7 means that companies 
recycling relatively more toxic waste and releasing relatively less toxic waste in the 
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environmental enjoy a lower spread on bond issues: investors grant them a lower cost of 
debt because of their environmental behavior. By contrast, the sign of the non-significant 
ENV-WASTE coefficient indicates that companies producing comparatively more toxic 
waste per dollar revenue should benefit from a lower cost of debt. But any conclusion 
based on this non-significant measure, whose low standardized coefficient indicates a low 
impact on the cost of debt, should be drawn cautiously. 
 Finally, Table 5.7 reports the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) as part of the 
collinearity diagnosis. It is used to test if some independent variables carry the same type 
of underlying information, making those variables highly correlated and leading to 
multicollinearity problems in the analysis. Multicollinearity problems can invalidate the 
regression analysis and thus should be addressed. VIF values greater than 10 are 
conflicting cases (Stevens, 1992). Figures in Table 5.7 show that no independent variable 
in the analysis is a concern for multicollinearity problems.  
 
5.7 Elements on Hypothesis 2 treatment 
As explained in section 4.2.2, Hypothesis 2 requires the use of data on commercial 
lending. I did not have the resources to obtain such data. I tried to use the initial bond 
yield spread on public issues of secured bonds and mortgage bonds as a proxy for the cost 
of secured debt, but the final sample resulted in only 11 cases. Such a small number does 
not allow the use of regression analysis. Multiple regression analysis should be used with 
samples of at least 100 cases in order to test individual predictors (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
1996). Moreover, data on public secured debt is a rather flawed proxy for commercial 
debt (secured or not secured). Yet, I use descriptive statistics to check if there is evidence 
supporting Hypothesis 2, even with a small proxy sample. 
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I focus my study on ERM variables and the spread, since there is no need to use 
control variables. As ENV-OUTPUT has been the only significant measure in the 
previous analysis, I closely look at its constituents ENV-REL and ENV-NRJ. Table 5.8 
reports descriptive statistics for the variables of interest, based on the panel of 11 cases.  
 
Comparison with the first sample described in Table 5.4 leads to several remarks: 
in this second sample, the spread granted by investors is much higher in terms of mean 
and median value than for the first sample. Moreover, median and mean values indicate 
that companies from the second sample have a much higher level of toxic compound 
release (ENV-REL) and a lower level of toxic compound recycling (ENV-NRJ), 
compared to companies from the first sample. As a result the measure ENV-OUTPUT 
has a lower median value. This could help thinking that Hypothesis 2 is partially 
supported: if a lower level of “end-of-pipe” treatment is theoretically associated with a 
Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics and variable definitions for Hypothesis 2 panel 
Descriptive Statistics (N=11)
Variables Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std. Dev.
Spread (basis point) 90.00 733.00 183.00 301.36 246.00
ENV-OUTPUT -1.09 1.36 -0.45 0.00 1.00
ENV-REL (%) 0.00 0.99 0.47 0.44 0.42
ENV-NRJ (%) 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.33 0.42
ENV-WASTE (lbs/$) 565.66 53820.48 3313.22 7875.31 15414.45
ENV-NPL (number) 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.09 0.30
ENV-ISO (dummy) 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.55 0.52
Spread Yield to maturity on first debt issued in year t + 1 minus the yield on US T-bond with closest maturity
Rating S&P Rating of the bond issue in year t + 1, converted in numerical variable
ENV-OUTPUT Factor summarizing the end-of-pipe treatment of toxic waste. A high value indicates that more waste
is recycled or used for energy treatment (ENV-NRJ), and less waste is released (ENV-REL), in year t-1
ENV-WASTE Amount of toxic waste produced for the year t-1, standardized by domestic sales
ENV-NPL Number of production sites on the National Priority List in year t
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higher cost of debt, then a sample of firms with relatively low values of ENV-OUTPUT 
should also show relatively high values of spread. 
Table 5.9 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for variables of interest. 
 
One can observe that there is no significant correlation between the spread and any of the 
chosen ERM variables. It tends to show that Hypothesis 2 is not supported for this 
sample. The positive correlation between ENV-WASTE and ENV-NPL is theoretically 
supported, but a correlation of this magnitude is unusual and not expected. All in all, no 
conclusion can be drawn at this point, due to severe restriction on sample size and on 
adequacy of data used as proxy. Further studies should be conducted on this particular 
topic, with appropriate commercial debt data and large samples. This would allow the 
comparison with results obtained in section 5.6.  




ENV-OUTPUT Pearson Correlation 0.086
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.840)
ENV-NRJ Pearson Correlation -0.083 0.936
**
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.844) (0.001)




Sig. (2-tailed) (0.646) (0.000) (0.011)
ENV-WASTE Pearson Correlation -0.322 0.492 0.299 -0.586
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.436) (0.216) (0.471) (0.127)
ENV-ISO Pearson Correlation 0.632 0.225 -0.087 -0.418 0.437
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.093) (0.592) (0.838) (0.303) (0.279)
ENV-NPL Pearson Correlation -0.261 0.493 0.277 -0.603 0.992
** 0.488
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.533) (0.214) (0.507) (0.113) (0.000) (0.220)
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Pearson Correlations and Significance level (p-values for two-tailed tests)
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6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The results presented in the previous sections provide new empirical evidence on 
the relation between Environmental Risk Management (ERM) and the cost of debt. They 
also add to the field of ERM, on the way it is considered and handled by firm managers, 
and on the way it is assessed by investors and credit rating analysts. 
 
6.1 Discussion on regression results 
In an attempt to build a single ERM variable based on a collection of available 
well-known indicators capturing most steps of an ERM framework, I find that there is no 
sufficient empirical evidence to choose this approach. In particular, correlations among 
the five environmental variables are rather low, and those variables do not share enough 
variance altogether to be replaced by a single factor. Measures of ISO certification (ENV-
ISO) and past environmental liabilities (ENV-NPL) do not correlate sufficiently with the 
other variables drawn from TRI reports to allow a conclusive factor analysis. It indicates 
that major U.S. companies, despite significant developments in the field of environmental 
risk assessment and management, do not seem to consider environmental risk 
management solutions altogether. Companies that encountered past environmental 
liabilities under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), with one or more facilities being listed in the public National Priority List 
(NPL), do not seem take a strong corrective approach to mitigate environmental risks in 
the future, by seeking third party auditing under ISO14001 certification, or reducing the 
release of toxic material in the environment. Similarly, companies certified ISO14001 are 
not found to apply a meaningful source reduction program to lower the level of 
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production-related toxic waste they have to handle, or to modify the quantity of toxic 
waste they release in the environment. Although the signs of the correlation coefficients 
between environmental variables are pointing in the expected direction, their low values 
do not support theoretical advices on the development of environmental risk 
management frameworks. Those results might be explained by a recent survey: Ruquet 
(2008) finds that companies are managing environmental risks in an ad hoc way and do 
consider them when planning major strategic activities. However it is not possible to 
conclude on this issue by using solely those empirical facts. I treated ERM variables as 
independent variables in the analysis to separate for the various stages of the ERM 
process. 
The preliminary analysis, based on the ordinal regression of bond ratings on ERM 
and control variables, confirms that the four selected environmental variables should be 
treated separately in the analysis. This is done to fully capture the effect of variance that 
they do not share in common. Their effects on bond ratings are distinct: the coefficient 
estimate of ENV-NPL (number of facilities on the Superfund National Priority List) is 
the only one to be significant among ERM variables. It confirms the assumption that 
rating agencies take environmental information into account when they issue a credit 
rating. This finding is consistent with their approach of liability estimations and asset-
retirement obligations: liabilities should be recognized on the balance sheet (Standard & 
Poor's, 2008), and most of their analysis is based on a five-year historical record of 
financial statements (Ederington and Yawitz, 1986). So ratings agencies clearly focus on 
major past environmental liabilities, the firm’s track record in the environmental field, and 
on liabilities they are able to price, that is to say environmental liabilities that have 
ramifications in the balance sheet (Voorhees and Woellner, 1998). As a result they should 
mostly rely on public data from the Superfund program. Graham et al. (2001) find a 
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negative relation between credit ratings and proxies for Superfund environmental 
obligations for the period 1990-1992. The preliminary analysis confirms that those ratings 
keep taking environmental liabilities from the Superfund program into account for the 
period 2002-2007, but also indicate that no other measure of ERM and potential future 
liabilities (through current toxic waste management policy) are considered by credit rating 
professionals. This conservative approach of environmental risks solely based on the track 
record could lead to miscalculation of ratings for companies taking increasing 
environmental risks with no ERM framework in place or if environmental regulation was 
amended rapidly. 
 
6.2 Implications for investors and managers 
The main regression analysis concludes on the relation between ERM variables 
and the cost of debt. All the main factors known to impact the initial bond yield spread 
are controlled for. This is to ensure that relations with environmental variables, whose 
effects are expected to be moderate compared to other financial factors, are reliable. 
Results confirm that debt investors do not consider environmental risk management as a 
whole, and do not ask companies to implement it as an integrated framework because 
they themselves look at limited aspects of it. I find that only the measure of end-of-pipe 
treatment, ENV-OUTPUT, significantly impacts the bond spread at the 5% level. The 
measure of source reduction, ENV-WASTE, is almost significant at the 10% level but its 
coefficient is negative whereas the Pearson correlation table indicates a positive 
correlation. As a result, no conclusion should be drawn from the non-significant 
coefficients in the analysis. The high level of significance of the ENV-OUTPUT 
coefficient proves that investors do look at TRI figures and some environmental risks 
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when granting public debt to large companies. Companies that favor recycling or energy 
recovery against the release of their production-related toxic waste benefit from a lower 
cost of debt on their bond issues. So investors recognize companies that implement 
environmental risk control, and also recognize that monitoring the end-of-pipe treatment 
of toxic waste allows the assessment of future environmental liabilities. All in all, the end-
of-pipe treatment represents the best indicator of a firm’s environmental liability 
mitigation plan. It gives an overview of future potential liabilities and it is a cheaper way 
of controlling environmental risks than source reduction (represented by ENV-WASTE). 
Debt investors recognize those qualities and their effect on risk mitigation, and this paper 
shows that they reward borrowers depending on their output track record. By contrast, 
investors do not seem to value source-reduction measures, although the bivariate 
correlation between ENV-WASTE and the bond spread indicates that more toxic waste 
production per dollar revenue could increase the cost of debt. Finally, investors do not 
seem to reward ISO14001 certification plans, or set higher risk premiums for companies 
with a track record of environmental liabilities. This is an important message for 
managers, as the companies like to publicly highlight their certification process on their 
website or on investor brochures, such as the annual report. It contrasts with part of the 
literature stating that annual reports are an important source to assess credit risk (Case, 
1999; Caouette et al., 2008). It also highlights the fact that debtholders care more about 
future environmental liabilities that may arise from poor production risk control than past 
environmental liabilities under CERCLA which are already quantified and assessed in the 
books. Managers can learn from those results which part of the environmental risk 
management framework is scrutinized by investors, and on which part they should 
publicly communicate to fully benefit from lower interest rates. 
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6.3 Limitations of the study 
Despite the conclusive results of the main regression, it is important to note that 
this study is an attempt to capture complex real-life decision processes by using statistical 
models. It is possible to conclude that investors favor some aspects of ERM over others 
only if we assume that all investors have a full knowledge of corporate ERM initiatives. 
Although it is probably not the case, most of debt investors are institutional investors and 
can rely on research reports that have an in-depth knowledge of companies’ 
environmental track record. Another limitation includes the sample size of 175 cases. This 
sample size limits the generalization of the results and their use in other statistical analysis.   
In this paper, I develop the second hypothesis stating that commercial lending is 
more affected by environmental damage than public investors under U.S. law. This is to 
account for direct environmental liabilities, impairment of assets held as secured loan 
collateral and environmental assessment fees. I was unable to conduct a conclusive 
analysis because I did not have access to bank loan data. I suggest that further research 
should be done on that particular topic, in order to find whether commercial lending 
institutions take those incremental risks into account, and whether they use a similar 
approach to value ERM practices. 
 
6.4 Conclusion    
This paper adds to the literature of risk management and environmental 
performance by empirically supporting the view thatt the cost of capital is a key link in the 
relation between environmental performance and financial performance. More 
specifically, I find that environmental risks are wisely assessed by debtholders and that the 
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risk of future environmental liabilities due to a lack of risk control translates into a higher 
interest rate charged by debt investors on new bond issues. The results may help 
managers to implement more effective environmental risk management frameworks, and 
to fully use environmental risk control to benefit from cheaper debt. But it may also 
advise debt investors on the way their peers value environmental risks and on 
improvements that could be made on risk assessment models. 
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